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1. THE CURRENT SITUATION REGARDING CONSTRUCTION LAND 
DEVELOPMENT IN SERBIA 
 
 
 
1.1. Legislative framework 
 
 
The Law on Planning and Construction stipulates that the funding for construction land 
development is provided from the following sources:  
 
 1) construction land rent;  
 2) construction land development fee;  
 3) construction land use fee;  
 4) other sources in accordance with the law.  
 
The funds from the construction land development and use fees are used for the development 
of construction land as well as for the construction and maintenance of utility infrastructure 
facilities. The construction land development fee is payable by the investor, with the amount 
of the construction land development fee being determined by the contract concluded 
between the investor and the municipality or the authorized company, based on the criteria 
and standards set by the municipality. The contract regulates the mutual relations relating to 
construction land development, the amount of the construction land development fee, fee 
payment schedule, as well as the volume, structure and deadlines for the performance of land 
development works. It is paid by investors before commencing the construction, towards 
infrastructure costs required for the facility completion. In other words, by paying the 
construction land development fee the investor usually acquires a right to:  
 
 1. land preparation – resolution of property issues, resettlement, planning and 
technical documentation, land reclamation, etc.  
  
 2. introduction of utility and other infrastructure at the land – water supply, sewerage, 
roads and parking lots, green areas, etc; in Belgrade land servicing does not include electric 
power supply, PTT network and district heating system, which are contracted separately, 
whereas in Novi Sad both electric power supply and district heating system are included in 
land servicing.  
 
The total development fee collected in 2005 was very high (10.5 billion dinars – around EUR 
120 million), which presents as much as 10.3% of the total fiscal revenues of the Serbian 
towns and municipalities. In practically all decisions of local communities it is stated that the 
fee is charged based of the actual development and servicing costs, immediately proceeding 
to the fee determination according to totally different criteria. These criteria are the same as 
those used when determining the construction land usage fee: surface area and purpose of the 
facility and its location. The quantification of the criteria is usually different for the two fees 
– the number of location zones differs, the classification of facility purpose differs, there are 
different criteria for the servicing level – but the principle is the same. Thus, thus appears to 
be an attempt to place a burden on the value of the facility and accompanying land through 
the fee.  
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Essentially, the link between the value of a location and costs of its servicing should not exist 
in principle. It seems logical that all locations in a town have equally good (or bad) utility and 
similar infrastructure, as well as that the value of locations varies greatly, depending on their 
commercial attractiveness – the value of a location has nothing to do with the costs of its 
servicing with municipal infrastructure. That is why it is obvious that the development fee 
does not present only a compensation paid by the investor for the previous or future costs of  
location servicing, but also a method of collecting town rent.  
 
In some towns (in Belgrade, for example) when land is to be rented out, the development fee 
is a subject of bidding, so the investor that offers the highest amount of the construction land 
development fee is granted a lease. This system has yielded in some cases excellent results in 
New Belgrade and other attractive locations, from the standpoint of fee amount 
maximization. This auction method of fee determination clearly demonstrates that the town 
authorities believe that their standard system of its determination – through the previously 
mentioned formulae – is not the best and that its performance is unsatisfactory, even when the 
locations are good and investment climate favorable. Then it is evidently better to organize an 
auction and collect large amounts of fees, as well as to select the best investors - those that 
are the most willing to pay for a certain piece of land. Nevertheless, the basic reason for 
choosing auction is the collection of land price, i.e. at least the price of land use right transfer, 
since there is no other method to collect the «price» of the land in the state property system. 
This shows that the land price is essentially determined at auctions, whereas the land 
servicing costs are just the starting (reserve) auction price.  
 
There is no doubt that the significant amounts for the development fee (millions and dozens 
of millions of euros) offered at auctions have nothing to do with the infrastructure quality and 
costs for the given facility; instead, they present a one-off payment for the land price defined 
as the capitalized rent. In other words, the high fee presents in fact a payment for the 
purchase of the right to use an attractive location. At the same time, it does not present the 
real purchase price, since the government is not selling the ownership right, but only the right 
of lease for a certain period of time. 
 
This is how the land rent payment is effected in the current system:  
 
 1. the first component is a lump sum payment, charged as the development fee; it 
contains a part that refers to infrastructure costs, but also a part that is a pure price of the land 
payable as a one-off advance payment which depends exclusively on the attractiveness of the 
location,  
 2. the second component is the rent/land usage fee, payable on a monthly basis in 
moderate amounts.  
 
Such a method of payment (a significant advance payment plus periodic payments) is 
convenient for the finances of the Serbian towns and local self-governments, since in such a 
way they obtain immediately, i.e. in advance the money they certainly need sorely in a short 
period of time. A leaser, i.e. local authorities collect a pure, periodic rent gradually, in small 
amounts, which is a less favorable solution.  
 
The land development fee is only in part what it nominally presents – infrastructure costs – 
whereas in other part it is a one-off collection of the capitalized rent, i.e. land price. 
Moreover, it can be said that this role of the fee is unnecessary and presents a remnant from 
the previous period, when it was necessary to justify its collection by the government with a 
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service provided in return, so a fee was invented for the previous or future infrastructure 
costs, although it is quite clear that the amount of the fee does not depend on them but on 
some other criteria. Those criteria attempt, on the basis of a formula, to determine the land 
value, which again has nothing to do with infrastructure costs. This little game did not make 
much sense even at the time when the development fee was created, and it makes even less 
sense today, when the circumstances have changed during the transition. Namely, it is now 
quite possible to collect from the investor not the supposed infrastructure costs, but what it is 
all really about: full rent in line with the plot value. The government leases a plot to the 
investor and has a right to charge a rent in a form that is acceptable to both parties, i.e. both 
as periodic payment or as a lump sum, or a combination of the two.  
 
 
1.2 Existing practice in construction land development in Serbia 
 
 
1.2.1. Belgrade 
 
 
The decision on the criteria and standards for the determination of rent and construction land 
development fee provides for the payment of this fee according to the zones and facility 
purpose. The stated decision divides the area of city zones into five zones from the center to 
the outskirts of the city. A «de luxe» zone has been introduced for the most attractive 
locations. The classification into only six zones can be assessed as inadequately precise for a 
city such as Belgrade. It can also be noted that the zones are completely different when the 
land use fee is determined, which calls for the maintenance of two separate data bases and 
unnecessary costs.  
 
Land development covers the costs of construction land preparation and servicing, as follows:  
 
 - construction land preparation includes exploratory works, preparation of surveyor 
and other basic data, preparation of planning and design documentation, resolution of 
property-legal affairs, resettlement, demolition of facilities for which such a course of action 
is foreseen in the plan, land reclamation, preparation of the land development  program and 
other works;  
 - construction land servicing includes the construction of facilities and reticulation of 
water supply, sewerage, roads with complete equipment, construction of parking lots and 
pedestrian areas, construction and development of public green areas with ancillary amenities 
and other works.  
  
It is worth mentioning that the construction land development fee in Belgrade does not cover 
the infrastructure costs about which the investor concludes separate agreements with the 
competent companies (electric power distribution facilities and reticulation, TT facilities and 
network, cable distribution system, district heating system, gas distribution system, etc.).  
 
The amount of the construction land development fee is determined depending on the 
following:  
 - public construction land development costs,  
 - purpose of the facility-premises (or land) planned for construction.  
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It should be noted that despite the fact that it is explicitly stated in the Decision that the 
amount of the fee depends on the development costs, from the rest of the Decision text and 
the practice it can be concluded that this is not so. The fact that the land is allocated through 
an auction, with the investor offering a certain amount of this fee demonstrates that the there 
is no real link with the costs. In this case the fee is there to simulate the land market, which 
cannot be characterized as bad.  
 
The construction land development fee is payable per square meter of premises, and not per 
square meter of land, and varies depending on the purpose, i.e. it ranges from 3,419 dinars/m
2 
(for the facilities of «social standard» (e.g. workers' mess) in the 5th zone) to 38,220 
dinars/m
2 
(for business/commercial facilities in the «de luxe» zone).  
 
As for the purpose of the facility, facilities are classified in 6 groups: facilities of «social 
standard», residential buildings, business/production facilities, business/service facilities, 
business/commercial facilities and single-family residential facilities. The amounts seem to 
be discretionary, not reflecting the actual construction costs, in particular in the three groups 
of business facilities. For example, in the first zone, the fees for production, service and 
commercial facilities amount to 16,303, 19,950 and 27,300 dinars/m
2
. It is difficult to 
comprehend why the servicing of the land on which a commercial facility will be built (e.g. a 
supermarket) «costs» 67% more per m
2 
than when a production plant of the same area is to be 
constructed. This seems to present a relic of the communist era, when the production 
activities were valued above the commercial activities, so they had to be «stimulated». It is 
commendable that in the «de luxe» zone the amount of the fee for single-family houses and 
residential buildings is the same and amounts to 20,475 dinars. What is surprising is that in 
all other zones the amount of fee for residential buildings is 60-65% higher than for single-
family houses per square meter. It is also worth mentioning that for petrol stations the fee 
amount is multiplied by 2, with even the area under the awning being taken 100% into 
account, although it certainly does not entail any costs of land servicing. 
 
It is worth looking at the exemptions and deductions provided for by the Decision. First of 
all, they refer to the Red Cross of Serbia (a 40% reduction), then to government bodies in the 
amount of 20%, as well as for the flats of the Solidarity Fund, for the flats built and financed 
by the Foundation for the Resolution of Housing Needs of Young Scientists and apartments 
for socially vulnerable persons whose construction is financed from the budget. Interestingly, 
the public construction land development fee for the construction of religious facilities, 
according to this decision, is charged at the level of only 10% of the fee, so it can be noted 
that the city of Belgrade conducts, through the construction land development fee, not only 
the social and economic, but the religious policy as well.  
 
 
1.2.2 Subotica 
 
 
The decision on the standards for the determination of the amount of the rent and of the 
construction land development fee provides that the fee is to be calculated based on the 
current level of utility infrastructure presence on the construction land, per square meter of 
the net area of the facility.  
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For example, if the location is fully serviced (including the electric power supply, pavements, 
water supply, sewerage, etc.) the basic fee per square meter amounts from 450 dinars/m
2 
(for 
the 7th zone) to 2,300 dinars/m
2 
(for the de luxe zone). This basic price is multiplied by a 
coefficient depending on the purpose of the facility in order to obtain the total fee. The 
coefficient ranges from 0.5 for public facilities to 2.5 for petrol pumps, betting shops, etc. As 
in Belgrade, the economic-production activities (coefficient 1.2) are favored over the 
business-service activities (1.8) and business-commercial activities (2). Unlike Belgrade, 
where single-family houses are favored over residential buildings, in Subotica the situation is 
reverse (coefficient 0.8 for residential buildings and 1 for single-family houses). It is 
interesting that in Subotica, when religious facilities are built, the fee is calculated by 
multiplying the basic fee with coefficient 1, i.e. there are no special incentives.  
 
As regards incentives, the mayor has a possibility to reduce the amount of fee by not more 
than 25%, as an «incentive for the construction of particular interest for the development of 
the municipality». He may do so in the following cases:  
 
 - a significant number of workers will work in the facility relative to the area of the 
facility;  
 - the investor invests significant funds in the utility infrastructure which is of general 
interest;  
 - the investor is obligated to pay the calculated fee within 30 days;  
 - the facility contributes to the environmental protection.  
 
With this decision, the municipality of Subotica is divided into eight zones (de luxe plus 
seven) which can be assessed as many, in view of the size of the town and the number of 
villages. Moreover, it is unclear why the villages in the Subotica municipality are classified in 
different groups, so the amount of fee in certain villages (e.g. Bačko Dušanovo) is double the 
fee amount in other villages (e.g. Tavankut). The reason cannot be that the costs of land 
development are twice as high.  
 
 
1.2.3 Paraćin 
 
 
The decision on the standards for determining and contracting the amount of the construction 
land development fee stipulates that the amount of fee depends on the degree of land 
development and land purpose. The components of the total fee are the following: 
construction land preparation costs, costs of preparation involving trunk and primary 
facilities, costs of secondary facility introduction and attractiveness of the location.  
 
For each of the six possible purposes (which are defined in the same way as in other analyzed 
towns) the fee components related to the costs are clearly defined and seem logical, except 
that in Paraćin business-commercial and business-service activities are slightly discriminated 
against in comparison with production activities (1390 dinars/m
2 
for production activities, 
1650 dinars/m
2 
for service and 1920 dinars/m
2 
for commercial activities). It is worth noting 
that in this fee component the location is never taken into account. The zone comes into play 
in the other fee component, which refers to the attractiveness of the location. There are six 
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zones in total and the fee ranges from 50 dinars/m
2 
for the facilities of «social standard» in 
the 6th zone to 1900 dinars/m
2 
for commercial activities in the 1st zone.  
 
 
1.3 Effects of the existing system 
 
 
The current regime of construction land ownership and management in Serbia, as well as of 
financing the construction of utility infrastructure, has few advantages. Only disadvantages 
are visible, which will be dealt with further in the text.  
 
Inefficiency of land use. The existing system of construction land use does not recognize the 
land market and transactions on such market, so it does not recognize the market price of the 
land either, market capitalized price or market rent. However, the economic theory, as well as 
the economic practice of the developed countries, point to the conclusion that without a real 
market in a certain resource there are no possibilities for its cost-effective (economically 
efficient) use. For the resource allocation to be cost-effective, there has to be a mechanism 
transferring a resource from those using it inefficiently to the hands of those that use it most 
efficiently, and those are the ones ready to pay most for it or for its use. The market is such a 
mechanism, at which the land is bought and sold based on free agreements and on freely 
formed prices.  
 
Such a position refers fully to the urban construction land as one of the most valuable 
resources in modern economies, including Serbia. Namely, the non-existence of the 
construction land market means that the price of land use is not formed based on the supply 
and demand or based on the costs and benefits the use of such land offers to its potential user, 
but on the basis of other criteria.  
 
When such an institutional solution is considered at the level of individual plot (location) it 
can be seen that in Serbia this location is not used by a potential user who was ready to pay 
the highest price for its use (capitalized price or periodic rent). This means that this lot is not 
used by economically the most efficient user, but by someone else, so this lot is used in an 
economically inefficient manner. Inefficient land allocation among users arises due to two 
facts: first, the user is selected administratively, i.e. by a decision of local authorities; second, 
it is not the market price proportionate to the location benefits (i.e. its potential profitability) 
that is paid for its use, but something else (land servicing costs or administratively set rent 
based on social and other, essentially political criteria). Such a system of price formation 
usually covers costs regardless of their level (and regardless of whether they are borne by the 
investor or end user) or even lower levels, not economically efficient land use.  
 
Despite that, the right of urban construction land use cannot be transferred to a third (natural 
or legal) person, which causes great lack of flexibility in the urban land use. Namely, the 
selected user is thereby forced to use that lot for an indefinite period of time (or for several 
decades), regardless of the changes occurring in his business environment  or in his 
operations. This prevents him from moving from one location to another, thereby reducing 
the spatial mobility of the user, causing a lack of flexibility in the construction land use.  
 
Apart from the non-existence of the land market,  a factor of use inefficiency are also the 
sociopolitical criteria in the allocation of use rights and in the usage fee determination and 
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collection. Namely, as any government activity, the disposal of state land in a democratic 
society in transition is inevitably politicized, i.e. the decision-making on disposal begins to 
have, apart from economic and financial motives, political motives as well: who is the winner 
and who is the loser regarding a decision, what kind of an effect a decision will have on the 
authorities' political rating, what are the interests of the coalition partners, how will the voters 
react to the decision and the like.  
 
Under such circumstances the social factor is frequently stressed more than it is necessary. 
For example, the government is overly understanding for an inefficient company which 
continues to hold a land and still exists for social reasons, i.e. to delay the laying-off of 
workers. Or, in determining the construction land usage fee the basis is often the estimated 
ability to pay, while the purpose is often defined (citizens, industry, crafts, financial services, 
etc.) based on the estimate of the degree of ease the users from various purposes will be able 
to bear costs and pay the fee.  
 
Naturally, these social factors have a negative impact on the allocation efficiency, because 
the land continues to be held by those who need socially motivated discounts by the local 
authorities and who are unable either to use the land efficiently or to bear normal costs of its 
use.  
 
A particularly negative contribution to the inefficiency of land use was provided by the 
following two characteristics of the construction land use fee and construction land 
development fee:  
 
1. Charging of the fee according to the area on which facilities have been or will be 
constructed; this stimulates utterly inefficient land use, because it does not penalize 
(financially) the one using the land inactively; thus, the same fee amount is paid by the users 
of two facilities of the same area, although one of them is using a small and the other one a 
large plot of land in the town center; this kind of system contributes to the degradation of the 
most valuable land, for example in the center of the large cities, because there is no incentive 
for the current owner or a mechanism that will force him to increase the degree of 
construction on the valuable land or to move out if he is not unable to do so; in other words, 
from the aspect of fee amount, for an investor or land user it makes no difference whether the 
construction level index on the given plot is 1 or 20, as only the size of the constructed 
facility will matter; in this way inefficient land use is directly stimulated, in particular in the 
city center; this means that at the locations in the city center there are economically 
inefficient land users, reducing the overall economic efficiency of the city economy; for this 
reason in the town centers (in Belgrade as well) it is possible to see hovels tying up the most 
valuable land, but their users still pay low usage fees, because they are payable on the facility 
area and not on the land value.  
 
2. The difference in the fee amount according to the facility purpose; in the Serbian towns the 
local authorities' partiality towards the industry and similar «production» activities has 
resulted in them paying relatively low rents, land use and land development fees; this 
difference stimulates the inactive land use even at valuable locations, for which it would be 
better if they were used intensively, which is not good for cost-effective and economically 
efficient land use; in market economies the rent amount (which is to a certain extent 
comparable to the usage fee) depends exclusively on the plot location, since the manner of 
use of that location is the user's private affair, unless violating the restrictions provided for by 
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the relevant urban plan; for that reason, in market economies the land on central locations is 
used exclusively by intensive land users, since others are unable to bear such high costs.  
 
In these ways the existing system of use and fiscal burden on the urban land not only fails to 
penalize the inefficient land use, but it even stimulates it with its instruments.  
 
Less investment/construction. The existing model of construction land does not present a 
good basis for the investors' decision-making whether to invest in Serbia or not, including 
facility construction. Namely, this decision does not depend only on the commercial aspect of 
the relevant activity, but also on the possibility of stable and certain use of land on which the 
facility will be built. If the land use is dubious and uncertain, then the interest of potential 
investors is certainly smaller.  
 
There are several sources of uncertainty in the existing construction land use model. First, it 
is the uncertainty regarding the duration of land use. Namely, even when the land is given for 
an indefinite period of time and when it is obtained for a certain period of time, there is no 
firm guarantee that this will be observed by the government and that the user will be able to 
enjoy the land use in the planned manner. The government can, and it has previously done so, 
amend the terms of land use through the amendments of laws or local decisions, with serious 
impact on all the elements of the land use contract. For example, it is possible to change, 
through legislation amendments, the existing use for an indefinite period of time to a definite 
period of time, such as 99 years or less. There can also be an amendment to the regulation 
plan and purpose of certain plots, leading to a termination of the use right for an indefinite 
period or even a definite period of time. Simply put, the level of certainly with the 
government as the leaser is not the same as with a private leaser, because the government can 
change the terms of use by one-sided acts, as it sees fit. 
 
Second, there is uncertainty about possible construction land privatization and, in particular, 
the method of privatization of construction plot that investor is using or wishes to use. The 
privatization of construction land is a possible or likely option in all transition or post-
transition countries, so potential investors have problems in assessing the probability and 
direction of such change. It is understandable why the possibility of privatization bothers 
them: it is quite conceivable that it could significantly worsen their position or cause them to 
incur increased costs. This is due to the following: 1) since the privatization method is 
certainly unknown until the parliament adopted the relevant legislation, the current lessor or 
user of the state land cannot know what solutions will be adopted and whether it will even 
remain as a lessor after the privatization as well; 2) if he does remain, he could be forced to 
pay a large amount for the purchase of the land, which could, together with the previously 
paid charges (for example, the land development fee) could be very high, even above what 
the land is worth and what the investor would be willing to pay.  
 
Third, there is also uncertainty for the land users regarding the manner of rent adjustment, i.e. 
the construction land use fee. This is not a private-law, contractual method concluded 
between a private owner and lessee, when the method of indexation or rent change is known 
and agreed upon in advance; instead, it is a contract with the government which it can, 
through legislative changes if nothing else, amend and, instead of one, introduce another 
correction mechanism. Long-term effects of the mechanism of rent change can be very large.  
 
Fourth (related to the previous), for the investor it is difficult, i.e. practically impossible, to 
assess the value of the given plot. Apart from the stated uncertainties, the reasons include the 
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non-existence of the legal construction land market and non-existence of full ownership over 
construction land. The legal market of urban construction land does not exist  because it is 
state-owned and its use is granted to users, i.e. users cannot sell it without the facility. The 
land sale is possible only together with the facility on it, but then it is not possible to separate 
the price paid for the facility from the price paid for the land. State ownership over 
construction land means that the urban land user owns only a partial set of ownership rights, 
i.e. it has a right to use the land in accordance with the law. Despite the fact that certain 
construction land is state-owned, it still has, or may have, a certain economic value for the 
user, because it enables or may enable the conducting of economic activity in accordance 
with the prescribed purpose. The uncertainty about the land value certainly acts as a deterrent 
for potential investors, because it is difficult to decide to invest when the investor is unclear 
how much what he will get through the investment is worth.  
 
All these uncertainties certainly reduce the willingness of potential investors to invest in 
Serbia. This applies to real estate investors, i.e. those who wish to engage in the construction 
and sale of commercial and residential facilities, as well as those who wish to invest in 
companies. The fact that this is not just a purely theoretical consideration is confirmed by the 
information about how certain foreign investors perceive the land regime in Serbia and its 
consequences: dissatisfaction with state ownership and the method of its use is widespread, in 
particular uncertainty regarding the future.  
 
Reduced land income of local communities. According to the existing construction land 
regime local communities collect less revenues from the land than they could if it were 
privatized. In such a way fiscal revenues sorely needed by local communities to meet the 
needs of citizens and economy in their territory are lost.  
 
The first loss is the lost opportunity to generate new revenues for the town budget from 
privatization and sale of land. Land is a valuable resource and significant revenues can 
definitively be collected from its privatization. Even if, together with privatization, the 
process of restitution is initiated, so one part of the land is returned to its former owners, and 
compensation is paid for another part, significant funds will certainly remain both from the 
proceeds from the land that was owned by the state even before nationalization (there was 
such land in larger towns), as well as from the probable difference between the sales price 
and compensation.  
 
Second, even regarding the current revenue from the land there is a loss in the present system 
relative to the private ownership regime. It is not clearly visible, but it does exist and is 
reflected in less revenue collected from the land usage fee in comparison with the property 
tax which would, as a standard tax, be collected on the private land.  
 
Three loss components are worth mentioning:  
 1. The government in Serbia is conducting, through the land use and land 
development fees, the social policy as well, by land classification according to the purpose, 
losing revenue in the process; such a broad social policy would not be feasible with the 
property tax, which would be collected on the total value, including the land, so the fiscal 
revenues would be higher.  
  
 2. When, regarding the land use and land development fee, broad zoning is 
performed, then the average fee in a zone must be lower than when assessing and collecting a 
charge based on the value of an individual location; namely, when it is necessary to have an 
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average charge for fairly diverse locations, the common charge is inevitably determined 
according to the least attractive locations and not the best locations; otherwise, those least 
valuable locations would have an excessively high price, unbearable for the owner/user (e.g. 
the charge for a location in the main and side street in a town cannot be the same); this 
determination of the average at a lower level certainly causes a loss of potential revenues, 
benefiting the users at the most attractive locations; the latest method of setting the rents 
through auction, applied in some towns in Serbia, corrects this weakness, but is unable to 
determine fees at all locations rented out, let alone determine the usage fee on locations 
rented out a long time ago.  
  
 3. Less efficient land use also leads to fiscal losses because the base increases more 
slowly than in the event of efficient use; namely, fiscal revenues from real estate, including 
land, in the cities around the world depends to a great extent on the value of real estate, as the 
tax base; in more advanced cities this value is higher than in the poor cities with lower-
quality management, so their revenues from the property tax are higher; that will happen in 
the Serbian towns as well: as the land is used better and economic growth accelerates, the 
value of real estate will grow faster, providing higher revenues from the local real estate 
charges.  
  
 4. There is certainly a loss regarding the land development fee, since a lower amount 
is collected there than would have been collected if the land were sold on an auction; namely, 
since renting out the land for a certain period of time, even if it is 99 years, presents a transfer 
of only part of property rights over the land to the new user, it is certain that investors will be 
willing to pay significantly less than if they were buying the land that is to become their 
property.  
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2. NEED TO REFORM THE CONSTRUCTION LAND DEVELOPMENT FEE  
 
 
 
The construction land development fee, together with the construction land use fee, was 
introduced in Serbia in the second half of the 1970s. That was the time of the self-
management-based socialist economy; hence, an economy that was a far cry from the 
standard market economy with all its supporting institutions, such as freely set market prices, 
property taxes, etc. The introduction of the two mentioned fees at that point constituted an 
attempt to introduce certain elements of market institutions into a non-market environment, 
such as the socialist economy.  
 
The demise of the socialist economy and the introduction of the institutions of a standard 
market economy in Serbia have eliminated the basis for the preservation of the two 
mentioned fees in their present form, i.e., they have created a need to reform the construction 
land development fee. That need has arisen from several elements of reform: the reform of 
local public finances, the privatization of construction land and the privatization of public 
utility companies.  
 
 
2.1. Reform of Local Public Finances 
 
 
The reform of local public finances, which was implemented in July 2006 with the adoption 
of the Law on Local Government Finances, has brought about an increase in non-shared 
revenues of local self-government units, in that this Law has turned the periodical property 
tax into the non-shared revenue of local self-governments, meaning that bodies of local self-
governments can now autonomously, within the range prescribed by the law, set the property 
tax rate. Furthermore, the Law defines another 15 non-shared revenues, namely various types 
of fees, fines, proceeds from sale, from lease, etc. Such reform, that is, the reclassification of 
the periodical property tax into non-shared revenue, has resulted in a strong growth in non-
shared revenues of local self-governments. Likewise, amendments to the Law on the Tax 
Procedure and Administration have assigned to local self-government units considerable 
powers, i.e., important functions associated with the administration of that tax, primarily with 
respect to the registration of taxpayers and their assets, the valuation of the tax base, as well 
as the assessment and collection of that tax.    
 
These amendments to the law have eliminated, i.e., significantly weakened the motivation of 
local self-government units to make no changes in the fees related to construction land. That 
is to say, those fees were perceived in the past as the main, that is, the most important non-
shared revenue of local self-governments in the circumstances in which the property tax did 
not accrue to local self-governments as non-shared, but rather as shared public revenue. That 
is why all those fees were zealously guarded, since they accounted for the bulk of the non-
shared revenue of local self-governments, thus enabling the bodies of local self-governments 
to have a bit more sound financial planning, and mitigating the uncertainty inherent in the 
character of shared revenues. Although, strictly speaking, the revenue from the construction 
land development fee is not public revenue, financial management of the revenue raised from 
that source has enabled a more flexible financial management and short-term bridging of all 
kinds of gaps in local finances. All the mentioned motives, irrespective of how legitimate 
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they were, are now considerably weakened by the new legal arrangements, which have turned 
such a powerful tax as the property tax into non-shared revenue of local self-governments. 
 
The mentioned changes have created conditions for a comprehensive review of the rationale 
for the existence, i.e., preservation of the fees related to construction land. It has already been 
proposed, within the framework of the reform of local public finances, to incorporate the 
construction land use fee into the property tax, and now all the conditions are in place to 
proceed with the re-examination of the survival of the construction land development fee and 
with a proposal for a possible reform of that fee.         
 
 
2.2. Privatization of Urban Construction land 
 
 
The adoption of Serbia’s new Constitution in the autumn of 2006 has removed a 
constitutional obstacle to the privatization of urban construction land, which was the main 
reason why this specific privatization was not undertaken for such a long time. Consequently, 
it is possible to expect a political decision to be taken soon to embark upon the privatization 
of this resource, which implies the passage of a relevant law that should define all essential 
elements of the privatization of urban construction land: a model, methods, scope and pace of 
the privatization, as well as the distribution of competences between the central and local 
authorities.   
 
Several proposals have been put forward in professional circles, which more or less 
consistently deal with the mentioned issues, i.e., define the general model of the privatization 
of urban construction land. Irrespective of which privatization model will be accepted, i.e., of 
how the key questions of that privatization will be addressed, it is certain that the 
privatization of urban construction land will bring along several major changes in the manner 
in which this resource is allocated.   
  
First, it is clear that the existing administrative procedure of ceding/assigning land to an 
investor for use, i.e., lease, by the local authorities, will be abandoned. Consequently, the 
local authorities no longer appear on the urban construction land supply side; instead, those 
appearing on that side are its private owners.    
 
Second, the non-transparent and non-market-based method for selecting investors, that is, 
users of urban construction land, according to which local self-government units, as the only 
de facto owners of urban construction land, enter into contractual relationships with selected 
private investors, i.e., users, will disappear. 
 
Third, land owners will receive from buyers the amount of the contractual selling price and 
all property rights will be then assigned to buyers, including the right to dispose of land, not 
just the right to use it, as has been the case so far. The buyer and the seller will find each 
other on the market for urban construction land.   
 
The practice so far has been to set and collect the construction land development fee on the 
basis of a contract pursuant to which the local authorities grant land to investors for use, but 
this type of land allocation will completely disappear through privatization. Specifically, land 
will be allocated to the investor in the following manner: he will acquire ownership, i.e., full 
property rights, namely through public sale (in privatization) or through a sales contract 
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between him and the private owner of urban construction land. In such a manner, the basic 
existing mechanism for the collection of this fee will be eliminated.  
 
It is obvious that all the changes, in which the privatization of urban construction land will 
inevitably result, unavoidably give rise to the need to review this fee. Admittedly, the 
possibility remains to collect this fee solely for rendering services associated with the 
provision of infrastructure for urban construction land. It is all the more so because it is clear 
that charges will be collected when buildings are constructed for connections to utility 
technical systems, and the character of these payments should be reoriented toward covering 
actual costs generated by the investor, i.e., new land users. The future of the construction land 
development fee should be considered in that context.    
 
 
2.3. Potential Privatization of Public Utility Companies  
 
 
Utility activities are performed in Serbia on the basis of the Law on Utility Activities, which 
provides for the possibility to entrust the performance of individual utility activities to private 
companies, as well as for the privatization of the existing equity in public utility companies. 
Likewise, the current Law on Concessions enables the implementation of individual projects 
in the field of utility activities. 
 
The reasons for the privatization of public utility companies in Serbia are multiple. They boil 
down to the improvement in economic efficiency of the use of existing resources, the creation 
of conditions for the financing of new investments with private funds (capital), as well as for 
the transfer of technology and know-how. The privatization of utility companies also implies 
a drastic change in their behavior relative to their present conduct.  
  
The change will be reflected in the necessity to cover full operating expenses, including the 
cost of capital expressed as a normal profit rate on invested capital. In other words, private 
utility companies, that is, private projects within technical utility systems, will render utility 
services only if their total costs are covered.  
 
The existing system of the construction land development fee implies that the bodies of local 
self-governments, or organizations that they have founded, use thus collected resources for 
investments in the facilities of the technical utility systems, irrespective of whether these are 
individual or collective utility consumption facilities, i.e., private or public goods. The thus 
constructed facilities are then handed over, that is, transferred to the competent public utility 
companies, and are included in the balance sheets of those companies. However, public 
utility companies are not investors; instead, the function of the investor is carried out by the 
competent organizations such as construction directorates or institutes.  
 
Such a system is simply unsustainable in the case of private utility companies, i.e., private-
public partnerships. Specifically, private utility companies act as any other company, that is, 
they invest on their own, regardless of how they have raised capital for investment. Their 
decision to invest is based on the business policy and for such companies it is unacceptable 
that others take investment decisions, invest and then transfer the thus acquired property 
(fixed assets) to a private company. That would be unacceptable for local self-governments, 
since such transfer would probably require an equity stake in private companies, i.e., 
appropriate participation in management. In other words, the existing system of collecting the 
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construction land development fee is completely incompatible with the privatization of public 
utility companies, i.e., private-public partnerships in these activities. 
 
All the above points to the fact that it is necessary to comprehensively re-examine the 
possibility to keep the construction land development fee, i.e., the possibility for its radical 
reform in case it is kept.    
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3. CURRENT SITUATION IN THE WORLD AND THE REGION 
 
 
 
3.1. United States 
 
 
In principle, in the USA any imaginable way of local infrastructure development funding is 
pursued: taxes (payable by all the inhabitants), price (payable by all service users), 
infrastructure development fees (impact fee, payable by investors for newly-constructed 
facilities) or grants from the state and federal authorities. The selected model varies greatly 
depending on the federal state and local self-government.  
 
As regards taxes, the local taxes (types and rates) vary greatly from one state to another, but 
local services are mostly financed from the property tax and partly from other taxes (personal 
income tax or sales tax). The fees include both the fees for the use of a certain service (user 
charge), or an asset, such as the water consumption fee, as well as one-off fees payable for 
the connection to the supply network. Among other fees (permit fees, development fees, 
dedications, inlieu fees, exactions), since the end of 1980s the local self-government units 
have been calculating and collecting the so-called impact fee. 
 
The impact fee has been gaining popularity in the past 20-odd years. The main reason seems 
to be the fact that in the late 1980s and early 1990s many local self-government units faced 
large problems with utility infrastructure development funding, so they had to resort to 
innovative methods of raising money. The Americans' perception that their taxes were too 
high had a similar effect, as the introduction of the new taxes or increase in the existing taxes 
was politically unacceptable. 
 
As stated previously, in the US there is a lot of diversity regarding utility infrastructure 
financing and the federal government did not interfere directly in this issue, leaving it to the 
federal states. However, the tax treatment of the impact fee, as well as individual judgments 
of the US Superior Court have certain consequences on the calculation and collection. For 
example, in the case Dolan vs. City of Tigard (1994) the Supreme Court concluded that the 
order of the city urban planners to define the purpose of part of a private plot (property) as a 
bicycle path, as well as the order to introduce greenery in part of the plot, presents 
«uncompensated expropriation of private property», and as such, a violation of the 5th 
amendment of the US Constitution. The US tax system considers the paid impact fee as 
«capitalized costs related to the building» included in the depreciation calculation. 
 
Apart from these details, the federal authorities have not dealt with this issue, but have left it 
completely to the states. Depending on the concrete answers to the questions of competence 
and fiscal system, the federal states introduced specific fees. 
 
As mentioned previously, nowadays approximately thirty federal states allow local self-
government units (towns, districts, school districts, boroughs), to levy a fee analogue to the 
impact fee. It is accepted that a system that meets the following requirements can withstand 
the test in court (since almost all decisions of the local self-government units were subjected 
to a judicial review by associations of entrepreneurs or by a concrete entrepreneur): 
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 1. A local self-government unit must assess the needs for capacity increase before 
adopting a decision to introduce an impact fee, as well as to determine which precise capacity 
is needed. 
  
 2) The local self-government must place such assessment at the disposal of the public 
for review.  
  
 3) The study must take into account the already existing surplus capacity, i.e. an 
impact fee cannot be charged if the existing capacity has not been used up. 
 
 4) The local self-government must adopt a clear plan or financing and construction of 
new capacity, which clearly provides when and how it plans to spend funds on capacity 
expansion. 
  
 5) The funding plan must contain the assessments of all costs of new capacity 
construction that are as precise as possible. 
  
 6) Those costs must be allocated fairly. In other words, the local self-government unit 
must allocate the capacity construction costs in accordance with the probable demand that 
will be generated by the construction of the new facilities. 
  
 7) The amount of fee must be proportionate to the cost arising from the construction. 
This means that the system must take into account various effects of different housing unites 
and different business facilities on the required capacity. In connection with this, the 
decisions introducing the impact fee only for a limited purpose of construction (e.g. for 
business facilities) are most often repealed in court. 
  
 8) The funds collected from the impact fee must be spent for the purpose which will 
benefit exclusively the newly-constructed facilities.  
 
The purposes for which the impact fee can be introduced vary to a great degree from one 
state to another. Several states (California, Florida, Hawaii, Rhode Island and Vermont) allow 
the use of the impact fee for practically all possible purposes: streets and roads, water supply, 
sewerage, storm water sewerage, parks, fire service, police, libraries, schools, garbage 
disposal, while on the other hand there are states that  do not allow the collection of the 
impact fee for some of these services. The most restrictive system exists in Illinois, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, where the law allows the impact fee introduction only for streets 
and local roads. 
 
Certain states have introduced restrictions with regard to the authority to introduce the impact 
fee. For example, in Texas and Wisconsin only towns can introduce the impact fee, while in 
Arizona it is defined in detail for which purposes the impact fee can be introduced by 
counties, and for which only by towns. Since in the US there is no uniform system of local 
self-government organization, such solutions should not come as a surprise. 
 
The requirements related to the documentation necessary for the impact fee collection are 
also worth reviewing. Almost all the states request, before a decision is made, that an analysis 
be prepared, as well as a list of projects that will be financed from the collected fee and a cost 
estimate for those projects. Most states have also introduced a requirement for the local self-
government units to determine precise geographical borders within which the fee will be 
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collected, based on the estimated benefit the newly built facilities will have from the 
infrastructure.  
 
With regard to the procedure, it also varies significantly from one state to another. However, 
certain basic elements can be identified. First, numerous states have introduced an obligation 
of adopting a decision on impact fee after public consultations. Also, many states (20 of 27) 
have introduced an obligation that the proceeds collected from the impact fee must be spent 
on the previously defined items in a certain period of time. If the funds are not spent, the 
money is returned to the investor.  
 
For example, in Santa Fe, New Mexico, the construction of new houses leads to the payment 
of the following amounts of impact fees.  
 
  
<1500 
sq. ft. 
1500-
2000 sq. 
ft. 
2000-
2500 sq. 
ft. 
2500-
3500 sq. 
ft. 
>3500 
sq. ft. 
Total 4,385 5,641 6,658 7,925 9,186 
Roads and streets 1,135 1,527 1,820 2,247 2,560 
Water supply and sewerage 2,336 2,781 3,177 3,504 4,048 
Parks 767 1,128 1,397 1,793 2,080 
Fire service 118 165 212 306 400 
Police 29 40 52 75 98 
 
An example of the calculation of impact fee in Greenville, Texas, might be worth 
mentioning. In Texas the impact fee can be collected for streets, water supply and sewerage. 
As regards the water supply, in Greenville the impact fee amounts to $408 per «unit», defined 
as a «¾ inch water meter equivalency», corresponding to the maximum flow of 15 gallons a 
minute. The fee amount for sewerage is $336 per «unit», defined in the same way, and for 
roads and streets it is $153 per unit. For roads and streets a «unit» is defined as one vehicle-
mile trip per day generated by the new facility. 
 
The number of units is determined on the basis of an adopted equivalency table. Thus, if a 
new facility requires a 2-inch water supply connection, this enables a maximum flow of 80 
gallons a minute, which is equivalent to the amount of 5.33 units (80/15). The amount of 
$408 is multiplied by that number, so the water supply impact fee amounts to $2,175. The 
same method (and the same table) is used to arrive at the amount of $1,792 for sewerage. 
 
As regards roads and streets, the facility purpose is used for the calculation of the number of 
units. For example, if the facility is to be a plant with 50,000 sq. ft, the table shows that it is 
assumed that each thousand sq. ft. of area generates 0.61 trip a day, of the average length of 
3.12 miles. By multiplying these three numbers (50, 0.61 and 3.12) we arrive at 95 «units». 
By multiplying 95 with the fee per unit ($153) we arrive at the impact fee for roads and 
streets of $14,535. If, instead of a plant, it is a fast food restaurant with 10,000 sq. ft, it is 
estimated that each 1,000 feet of area generates 11,7 trips of 1.15 miles on average, which 
gives 128.4 units (10 times 11.7 times 1.15), or 19,645.2 dollars. 
 
For some other purposes of the facilities (for example schools or hospitals) instead of the 
facility area, the number of students or hospital beds is used in the calculation of the «unit». 
The equivalency table used in Greenville is presented in Annex 1. 
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3.2. Bulgaria 
 
 
In accordance with the Law on Local Taxes and Fees, the Bulgarian self-government units 
are allowed to collect the following taxes and fees: the real estate tax, gift tax, motor vehicle 
tax, concession income, garbage disposal fee, fees for technical and administrative services, 
fees for agricultural property protection, as well as the fee for the use of nurseries, day care 
centers, social care institutions, etc. As seen from the above, there is no special fee or tax 
which serves exclusively for the development of utility activities and land servicing, and the 
development of local infrastructure is almost exclusively financed from user charges. 
 
The situation in that respect is quite specific in Bulgaria. Namely, until the adoption of the 
stated Law (2003), utility infrastructure was, to a significant degree, financed from the grants 
received by the local self-governments from the national budget. For example, in 2001 and 
2002 more than 55% of the funds spent on the construction of local infrastructure arrived 
from the national budget, and around 45% from the local budget or user charges.  
 
Bulgaria also had a rather odd restriction, prohibiting the local self-government units from 
investing more than 10% (1999), 5% (2000) and 25% (2002) of the local budget in 
infrastructure projects.  
 
After the reforms implemented following the adoption of the stated Law, the situation is 
somewhat better, but the local self-governments still do not have the right to collect fees 
related to construction land development, with the development being financed from user 
charges, local budgets (payable by all local taxpayers) and from the grants from the national 
budget, i.e. from all Bulgarian taxpayers. The situation is somewhat complicated by the fact 
that Bulgaria also has a right to funding from the EU funds, but the fact remains that the 
system is quite inadequate and does not guarantee in any way quality and efficient 
development of the Bulgarian towns and municipalities. 
 
 
3.3 Croatia 
 
 
The Law on Municipal Economy provides for the following financing of utility 
infrastructure. 
 
The construction of facilities and installations of utility infrastructure for public areas, 
unclassified roads, cemeteries and crematoria, public lighting, is financed from the communal 
contribution, local self-government budget, concession fee and other sources determined by a 
separate law. 
 
The construction of facilities and installations of utility infrastructure and purchase of the 
equipment for potable water supply, waste water sewerage and treatment, gas supply, heat 
energy supply, is financed from the user charges, connection fee, local self-government 
budget, concession fees and other sources determined by a separate law. 
 
The construction of utility infrastructure facilities and purchase of passenger transport 
equipment, sanitation, municipal waste disposal, green markets, are financed from the user 
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charges, local self-government budget, concession fee and other sources determined by a 
separate law. 
 
The communal contribution is calculated based on the volume, i.e. per m3 (cubic meter) of 
the facility built on the plot, and in the event of a structure being demolished for the purpose 
of building a new one or in the event of an existing structure being extended, the municipal 
tax is calculated on the basis of the difference in volume relative to the previous structure. 
 
The unit value of the communal contribution for the calculation per m3 of the structure being 
built is determined for various zones in the town or municipality. This value is the highest for 
the first zone and cannot exceed 10% of the average construction costs for a m3 of standard 
structure in the Republic of Croatia, with this data being released by the minister in charge of 
municipal economy. 
 
With regard to connection to the network, the local self-government assembly adopts a 
decision on connection to utility infrastructure for potable water supply, sewerage and storm 
water sewerage, gas supply, heat energy supply. 
 
The facility owner is obligated to connect his structure to utility infrastructure for potable 
water supply and sewerage. The owner of the construction plot or the structure pays the 
actual costs and consumed material related to the utility connection directly to the contractor 
based on the contract and invoices for the work performed. However, the amount of 
connection fee per connection for residential purposes cannot exceed the average monthly 
gross wage in the Republic of Croatia for the previous year. 
 
For example, in the City of Zagreb, the communal contribution ranges between 20 and 180 
kunas per cubic meter. The Decision on Communal Contribution also prescribes that a 
municipal tax payer - natural person building a residential facility for his own needs, with a 
volume up to 300 m3 (Article 13 of the Decision), at his request, can be exempt from the 
payment of the municipal tax, depending on the amount of the average income per member of 
the payer's family household for the previous year and the amount of the average monthly 
paid net wage per employee in the legal entities of the Republic of Croatia in the same period, 
with the reduction amounting from 50 to 100%. 
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Annex 
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4. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FUTURE SYSTEM 
 
 
 
This section will provide an outline of the principles on which a future system should be 
based intended for financing capital infrastructure building at the local level in Serbia. On the 
one hand, those principles should indicate which features of the reform system are considered 
desirable, while on the other they should constitute criteria on the basis of which a decision is 
to be taken as to the choice of the financing method. The basic principles and/or criteria 
include economic efficiency, transparency, fairness, contribution to economic growth and 
administrative simplicity. 
 
Alternatively, there are various sources for financing investments into local utility and 
infrastructure activities, such as taxes, borrowing, the construction (construction land 
development) fee, the price of the utility/infrastructure service, etc. Each of those sources, or 
mechanisms, for construction financing has its own advantages and disadvantages from the 
standpoint of the mentioned criteria, which will be discussed in the text below.   
 
 
4.1. Efficiency 
 
 
Efficiency in the field of use and construction of urban land can be manifested in several 
ways, which differ greatly among themselves. For example, instruments of construction 
financing certainly affect a city’s population density or traffic arrangements and the like, in 
this manner making their contribution to defining the profile of a city, and to its construction. 
Thus, for instance, differing arrangements related to contsruction land development feeby 
economic sector of use (industry, crafts, etc), in their present form in Serbia, can result in 
unnecessary favoring of certain activities and in disincentivization of others, in different 
investment needs, in the breach of the fairness principle and in disincentives to investment 
and economic growth. 
 
Still, this report will look at economic efficiency, i.e., the issue of efficient resource 
allocation. It will be defined as such utilization of land where the returns from different land 
uses are even-profiled, after advantages of the location and town planning arrangements have 
been taken into account. In other words, it means a reasonable distribution of land across 
various uses (for housing and business premises, various activities, etc.), with each lot being 
used by the one who will make the best, i.e., the most efficient use of it, and that is usually 
the one who is willing to pay the highest price for it. It is understood, of course, that the 
regulation of land utilization and subsidies of different kinds undermine the efficiency of land 
utilization.  
 
Urban land should be used efficiently, because inefficient use entails, as the first 
consequence, an unnecessary expansion of the city and degradation of the environment, and 
as the second one unnecessary infrastructure costs. Urban productivity predominantly 
depends on the spatial concentration, which enables fast turnover of labor, goods, services 
and information in a particular area. The ability of workers and consumers to quickly get 
from one part of the city to another constitutes one of the main development factors of cities, 
if not the main one. 
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One of the fundamental prerequisites for an efficient resource allocation is the non-existence 
of the so-called external effects, that is, a prerequisite that every economic actor bears all the 
costs incurred on account of his activity. However, in the construction of residential or 
business facilities, costs are always incurred, which are not related solely to those facilities as 
such; there also are costs that are not directly borne by the investor but rather by the local 
community. These are the costs of providing utility infrastructure, namely not the one on the 
facility itself, but the one at the level of the local community (e.g. additional traffic load on 
all routes in the city), environmental pollution, a higher pressure on schools and health 
institutions in the area and the like. If the investor has not covered these costs as well, the 
local community will have to cover them through local taxes or borrowing, with negative 
effects on the existing users and/or the quality of services. At the same time, such an 
arrangement will constitute a subsidy from old users to new ones, which will provide 
incentives for building even beyond the desired level.  
 
The instrument, which is used in many countries as a corrective factor, i.e., as a factor which 
is supposed to internalize those costs by shifting them to the investor, and which is called the 
construction land development fee in Serbia, is known in literature under its English name the 
Impact Fee. It is, consequently, an attempt by the local community to charge the investor 
(and the future owner of the real estate) for all those costs that it will bear itself in order to 
provide to those future owners the necessary utility, infrastructure services, i.e., in order to 
prevent the deterioration of the quality of services.  
 
As opposed to this fee, there are those methods of financing additional infrastructure 
according to which the entire local community takes part in its financing: local taxes, 
borrowing or a rise in the price (user charge) of a particular service. In other words, in all 
three mechanisms additional costs are not borne exclusively by entrepreneurs and owners of 
new facilities, but by everybody and all – both old and new users of services. 
 
From the standpoint of Pigouvian theory of economically efficient allocation there is no 
doubt that the impact fee is an instrument that increases economic efficiency, because it leads 
to the internalization of external effects, thus boosting building to the level of cost efficiency 
and actual cost-effectiveness. This is the reason why it is used in many countries, like the 
U.S. and Serbia, as an instrument for financing infrastructure and utility services. On the 
other hand, other mentioned financing methods are based on the spillover of effects, i.e., 
costs of building, from new users to old ones, which encourages non-efficient resource 
allocation.  
 
Although a more efficient instrument in theory, the impact fee faces difficulties in practical 
life, which call into question its efficiency. Let us mention two factors. The first one is the 
difficulty related to the technical operationalization of the fee. Specifically, the whole idea is 
based on making the fee equal to the marginal costs caused by new building, which should 
result in the mentioned internalization of external effects. However, an attempt to calculate 
marginal costs is faced with major difficulties, such as the non-availability of data and the 
like.  
 
The second factor, which often has a significant impact on the end-result, is a political 
process for determining the fee, which frequently deforms even the best of ideas. More 
specifically, the existing service users and politicians are motivated to sharply raise the 
development fee, namely considerably in excess of the actual costs. In such a manner, the 
present users are trying to shift part of their costs (of improvement) of infrastructure to new 
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owners, as well as to contribute to a rise in the price of new facilities by increasing the level 
of fees, which will inevitably result in a rise of the value of substitutes – the already existing 
facilities owned by them. Politicians and local officials also have an interest in higher fees, 
since they bring more money to the budget, and also please their electorate – the existing 
owners (dwellers). In light of the above, it is very questionable whether impact fees can be set 
so as to internalize external effects, as prescribed by economic theory. This is how the long-
term interest of building and improving the quality of services is lost in a more distant future.  
 
 
4.2. Transparency 
 
 
In the context of infrastructure financing, transparency will be understood to mean the ability 
of all, and primarily of the population of a city, to find out about the costs imposed by 
someone on utility and infrastructure systems, and the link of payments and financing of 
infrastructure with those costs.  
 
Transparency is an important feature of a good arrangement, since it facilitates the perception 
of the financing system by all, and particularly by citizens, as well as the adoption of prudent 
financial decisions. Moreover, among both citizens, who use infrastructure systems, and 
investors, who pay for their construction, the linkage between costs and payments will also 
facilitate collection from both categories of users. More specifically, the willingness of every 
citizen to pay for his own direct costs, expressed through a bill for the use of a service (water 
supply, waste collection, etc.), is greater than his willingness to pay a higher property tax, 
where the increase would be a result of the consumption by all citizens. Simply, there is less 
evasion of payments on the part of both dwellers and investors when they know that they are 
paying for their own costs, not the costs of others.  
 
Hidden costs, on the other hand, considerably aggravate the taking of rational decisions, since 
it is not known then, even roughly, who spends what and who is taking, and how much, from 
the mutual coffers filled by taxes. Secondly, they greatly facilitate the provision of hidden 
subsidies or profits to individuals or classes of the population, at the discretion of the local 
authorities. Consequently, transparency is a barrier to corruption in this case, too.  
 
From the standpoint of transparency, a higher mark is given to the impact fee and the user 
charge, because they are both linked with costs: the user charge is a direct expression of 
consumption, and the use fee is an expression of investment costs. The other two methods of 
financing– out of taxes and borrowing – have proven themselves to be weaker, since they are 
not paid by the one on account of whom something is built; hence, they constitute a collective 
fund from which only some are taking, while everyone is contributing.  
 
 
4.3. Fairness 
 
 
In this case, fairness will be understood to mean the absence of undeserved spillovers, that is, 
rents, in different arrangements intended for financing utility activities. The fairness of a 
system is a desirable feature not only for moral reasons, but also for functional ones. For, 
when a system is widely perceived as fair, it is then certain that it will operate with 
considerably less difficulties and be more lasting than alternative systems. In such a situation 
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both citizens and investors are more willing to adhere to the rules of the system and to act in 
line with them. 
 
From the standpoint of the fairness criterion, the impact fee has the best track record, since it 
is based on the principle according to which everybody pays his own bills, that is, the 
investor also covers the costs which his building will cause in relation to utility infrastructure.  
 
It is possible to consider fair the system of financing utility infrastructure building by 
borrowing, too, but in a different manner. Specifically, future generations of the population in 
a given local community will also benefit from permanent facilities, which facilities of utility 
infrastructure normally are. Therefore, the arrangement that transfers part of the costs to 
them, too, precisely in compliance with the principle that everyone should pay his own bills, 
through the servicing of long-term loans out of which the building of infrastructure is 
financed nowadays, is also fair. This principle can be abused, though, by shifting a (too) large 
share of the burden to the future generations, together with the explanation, i.e., excuse about 
fair burden sharing.  
 
 
4.4. Investments and Economic Growth 
 
 
There is no doubt that the construction of residential and business facilities depends on the 
system of financing utility infrastructure, since different financing systems carry different 
costs of building. In other words, the costs of construction depend on the choice of the 
financing system, and so do the volume of building and total investment in building.  
 
Different modalities of utility infrastructure financing have different impacts on the costs of 
building. The greatest (negative) impact is indubitably made by the impact fee since only that 
fee includes, or should include, all the costs of the building of that infrastructure and it should 
be incorporated in total costs of the building of business or residential premises, while other 
methods (taxes, borrowing and the user charges) do not do that at all, that is, they do not 
increase the costs of building commercial facilities on account of the costs of utility 
infrastructure. Consequently, the introduction of the impact fee impacts the most adversely 
upon investments in the building of commercial facilities, while other financing methods are 
more stimulating. Of course, the most stimulating method for financing utility infrastructure 
vis-à-vis investment and economic growth is borrowing, since it pushes all the costs to the 
future.  
 
Still, there is no such thing as a free lunch, hence all the methods have their flaws. 
Borrowing, when it is too high, threatens the sustainability of local development, which 
means that it can be used as a financing method to a limited extent only. Or, the avoidance of 
the impact fee and the financing out of taxes encourage investments in commercial facilities 
in the short run, but in the long run the taxation of property is increased in order to raise the 
necessary funds, which, in turn, decreases the cost-effectiveness of investments. 
 
 
4.5. Administrative Simplicity 
 
 
 
Center for Liberal –Democratic Studies 
26
Reform of Land Development Fee in Serbia 
The last criterion is the criterion of administrative simplicity. Its significance is derived from 
the fact that the local authorities usually do not possess a great amount of administrative and 
professional resources, so they should not take upon themselves tasks that are complex in the 
conceptual sense and demanding in terms of time and operations. This is particularly true in 
the case of smaller municipalities in Serbia, which lack professional staff.  
 
It turned out that the fee is unfavorable from the standpoint of administrative simplicity, since 
it is a special, earmarked instrument, which would not have existed otherwise. In addition, an 
important complication is the calculation of the fee as such, since it is a complex 
methodological task, which municipalities very often cannot carry out on their own.  
 
Other three financing methods have proven to be simpler, because they already exist, even 
without the function of collecting funds for financing utility infrastructure, so this new task is 
just an additional one and it is expressed by using the existing instruments, with an increase 
in the amount. Thus, for example, the property tax is a standard tax and shifting the role of 
raising funds for the financing of infrastructure to it would result only in a rise in its rates, 
without any other operational complications. Admittedly, a rise in the rates could encourage 
higher evasion, with negative consequences. The same thing is with the prices of utility 
services, which only need to be raised, with a similar danger related to evasion. 
 
 
* * * 
 
This brief examination of individual methods for financing the construction of utility 
infrastructure by means of several reasonable criteria demonstrates all the complexity of the 
analysis. The main conclusion is that there is no arrangement which is the best according to 
all the criteria, but rather that parameters of individual financing instruments and other 
elements of the system for management and use of land and infrastructure, including utility 
infrastructure, are also of great significance. This will be discussed in more detail later in the 
report. 
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5. THE POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR REFORMING THE LAND DEVELOPMENT 
FEE 
 
 
 
The consideration of possible options for reforming the land development fee concentrates on 
the financing of the utility infrastructure development, i.e. “providing the land” with the 
capital facilities of technical utility systems. 
 
The utility infrastructure encompasses all facilities of technical infrastructure systems that 
enable the provision of utilities, whether they are private goods, that is, services for 
individual consumption (such as: water supply, wastewater drainage, district heating, gas 
distribution, waste collection, etc) or public goods, that is, the services for collective 
consumption (such as: construction, cleaning or maintenance of public areas, construction 
and maintenance of streets, public greenery, storm water drainage, etc).    
 
The development of utility infrastructure implies capacity increase in all segments of 
technical infrastructure systems. In such development, it is necessary to take into 
consideration that networks of technical utility systems are not homogeneous. Some segments 
of the system may be allocated to end users or groups of end users, i.e. these segments serve 
for the provision of the relevant utility service to such end users only. When constructing the 
facilities, it is usual to finance all these technical system segments from the “service 
connection fee”, i.e. to charge investors, or new users, directly with the actual costs of 
connection to the utility network. The actual costs are charged by utility companies (e.g. 
water supply companies, district heating companies or gas distributors) or other infrastructure 
service providers (power distribution company, telephone company, CATV operator, etc).  
 
However, the new users of utility services do not generate only the costs of connection to the 
existing technical utility system. These users also generate additional demand for some utility 
service (water supply, for instance), which means that the capacity of all facilities, i.e. not 
only the segments that serve the new users directly, but all segments of the system, need to be 
increased by the relevant quantity. In the case of water supply, this means that the capacities 
of the water intake, water treatment facilities, pumping stations, trunk pipelines, etc. should 
be increased by the relevant quantity. The question how the investments into these facilities, 
so-called capital utility infrastructure facilities, are to be funded, particularly for the 
construction of those facilities that benefit all users of utility services, not only investors, i.e. 
new users.   
 
The costs of capacity increase for technical utility systems are the so-called long-term 
marginal costs, i.e. the costs of capacity increase by one additional unit (for example, the 
additional capacity of 1 litre of water per second). This is the difference between these costs 
and short-term marginal costs, i.e. the costs of providing an additional unit of that utility 
service within its existing capacity (for example, the costs of providing an additional litre of 
water to a consumer). Therefore, the long-term marginal costs are, in fact, fixed costs – they 
do not change with any change in production volume within the pre-defined capacity. 
However, this does not mean that they do not change with a change in capacity. The long-
term marginal costs usually rise with capacity increase, so that it is usually more expensive to 
raise the water supply capacity from 300 to 301 l/s, than from 14,000 to 14,001 l/s. This 
stems from the fact that the most productive solutions, or capacities, are used first, and then 
those that are less and less productive must be applied.  
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It is also to be noted that the operation as well as construction of the capital facilities of utility 
infrastructure shows a very high level of indivisibility. Namely, for numerous technical 
reasons, the increase in capacity is not continual, but abrupt. A new water treatment facility 
may have the capacity of, say 2,000 l/s, and this abruptly increases the capacity of the capital 
facilities of utility infrastructure, i.e. the capacity of technical utility systems. Since this is an 
abrupt increase in capacity, the costs are incremental and, if divided by the unit of capacity, 
they can be shown as average incremental costs, i.e. an approximation of long-term marginal 
costs.  
 
The above specificities refer mainly to networked utilities that offer private goods, i.e. the 
services for individual consumption. The situation is somewhat different in the case of public 
goods, i.e. the services for collective consumption. Although it is impossible to precisely 
delineate “connections” and capital facilities because the end users cannot be identified, it is 
still possible to differentiate between a local public good in the immediate vicinity of a new 
facility, which needs to be financed from the impact fee, from a local capital public good, like 
an inner city by-pass road (“inner ring road”) that benefits all city inhabitants.  
 
Preliminary consideration of the facilities of utility infrastructure points to the diversity of 
such facilities and their different economic characteristics.   
 
Table 1. Economic characteristics of utility infrastructure facilities 
 
Service Indivisibility Natural 
monopoly 
Public 
good 
External 
effects 
Water supply Yes Yes No High 
Sewerage Yes Yes No High 
Storm water drainage Yes Yes Yes High 
District heating Yes Yes No High 
Gas distribution No Elements Yes Moderate 
Maintenance of 
cleanliness  
No Elements No High 
Waste collection No Elements No High 
Waste disposal Yes No No High 
Construction of public rail 
transit systems 
Yes Yes Yes Moderate 
Construction of streets and 
public areas 
No Elements Yes Moderate 
Construction of public and 
other green surfaces 
No No Yes Moderate 
Construction of cemeteries  No No No No 
Construction of public 
parking areas 
No No No No 
Bridges, waterfront and 
river beds 
Yes No Yes Moderate 
Public lighting No No Yes No 
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5.1. Alternative mechanisms for utility infrastructure development funding 
 
 
As mentioned above, any consideration of the future, or reform, of the land development fee 
is based on the comparative analysis of various options available for funding utility 
development, i.e. for funding the construction of capital facilities of utility infrastructure 
systems.    
 
There are three basic and one auxiliary mechanism for funding this type of investments.   
a) Impact Fees  
b) User Charges  
c) Local public expenses – budget funding 
d) Loans – bridging of excess expenses over time  
 
Loans are an auxiliary mechanism for funding the investments into the capital facilities of 
utility infrastructure systems, since they only help in bridging a deficit in time. Namely, a 
loan once taken must be repaid, and the revenues from which the loan is to be repaid 
inevitably fall into one of the three sources listed first.  
 
The evaluation of each of the above mechanisms, i.e. sources of funds for the investment in 
capital facilities of utility infrastructure systems is based on the following five criteria:  
1. Efficiency; 
2. Fairness;  
3. Transparency; 
4. Investments and economic growth; 
5. Ease of implementation – level of administrative demands. 
 
 
5.1.1. Impact Fees 
 
 
The Impact Fee (hereinafter, the fee) is, generally speaking, a fee that is, or should be, equal 
to the costs generated by such investor, i.e. to the costs of development (increased capacity) 
of utility infrastructure systems. In other words, the amount of fee should be such as to cover 
long-term marginal costs of utility infrastructure system operation. It is important to mention 
that the fee does not serve to cover the current, i.e. operating costs of providing utility 
services, including depreciation. Such costs should be covered from the user charge, where 
the charge can be collected (private goods) or from a local budget (public goods).  
 
The fee is, in general, an economically efficient method of funding, since it enables that all 
costs are covered and that the investors, or new users, bear the costs they generate. This 
further allows for the application of the basic rule of efficiency - the one who generates costs 
should be the one to pay for them - which creates efficiency incentives for each participant in 
the game. The equality of the fee with the long-term marginal costs also enables the 
application of the second rule of economic efficiency - the price (in the most general sense) 
should be equal to marginal costs. In this way the external effects are internalized in a way, 
which is a specific aspect of observing economic efficiency in this context. Namely, the 
investment implementation as such leads to external effects, since the increased consumption 
of utility services reduces the effective capacity of infrastructure systems, which causes 
disruptions of supply to all consumers, i.e. all those consumers who had already been 
 
Center for Liberal –Democratic Studies 
30
Reform of Land Development Fee in Serbia 
connected to the system and had a regular supply before the investment was made. In this 
way (by disrupting the supply) the investment has created external effects that can be 
eliminated only by expanding capacities. The investor bearing the capacity increase costs 
internalizes the external effects generated by him, which leads to economic efficiency by 
eliminating the moral hazard.  
 
Naturally, the necessary condition for achieving the above efficiency is to set the fee 
accurately at the level of actual long-term expenses for each new user, i.e. precisely at the 
level of expenses generated by the new user. Any deviation to one side or the other (over- or 
under- estimating) inevitably leads to the impairment of economic efficiency.  
 
However, there is a situation when even the fee defined in such a manner can generate 
inefficiencies. Everything presented above was based on an implicit assumption that the 
consumption of utility services by existing users does not change. However, if the existing 
users are allowed to increase their consumption, they do not bear expenses generated by such 
behavior. Namely, the increase in consumption by the existing users also exerts pressure on 
the increase in capacity, meaning that this, too, creates external effects within the 
infrastructure system. In other words, a part of the need to increase the capacity of utility 
infrastructure is, or may be, the consequence of an increased consumption by existing users, 
while the total cost of such a capacity increase is borne exclusively by the new users, i.e. 
investors. This creates a certain, although not considerable, moral hazard.1  
 
The fee also meets the fairness criterion, considering that the basic principle of fairness is that 
the one who generates expenses should be the one to bear them. For instance, if there were no 
such new investments, the total costs of system operation would be borne by the existing 
users through user charges, which indirectly indicates that the solution is the right one, since 
one group of users does not subsidize the other group of users. The only exception to this is a 
marginal case when the existing users increase consumption, since the fee results in a 
situation where the investors, i.e. new users, subsidize the existing ones.    
  
The fee may also be a transparent funding method, that is, in principle, it really is so. The 
investor knows how much he should pay, why he should pay it; they know it in advance and 
can make their business decisions accordingly. The ex ante business decision made in such a 
way is sound, since a solid projection of costs was made: in the future the investor, i.e. new 
user, will bear only the current costs resulting from his consumption, which means that he 
can perform a sound business calculation ex ante. To maintain the transparency of the fee it is 
crucial that everyone knows in advance all elements of the fee system and that such a system 
is stable.  
 
At first glance, the fee has no favorable effects on investments or economic and urban 
growth, since investors’ expenses/costs increase. Thereby, it is certain that the introduction of 
the fee decreases the volume of investments, since some investment projects with the new, 
increased expenses, may not be able to reach the required rate of return, and thus the 
investors may give up the investment, or at least the investment in that town. Based on that, 
one may conclude that the introduction of the fee slows down economic and urban growth.  
     
                                                 
1 The basic cause of increased consumption in the case of general population can be the increase of income, 
since utility services fall into the category of normal, not inferior goods. In the case of businesses, the basic 
reason may be increased capacity utilization. Both types of growth are related to economic prosperity.   
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However, such a selection of investors, in the long run, has a beneficial effect on economic 
and urban growth. Not only have all costs been covered, but the investment projects 
implemented are only the economically efficient ones (those that can cover their own 
expenses), thus fostering the specialization of towns in those investment projects at which 
they are the best (a kind of territorial division of labor). This creates conditions for an 
efficient and sustainable economic growth. This means that the initial reduction of the growth 
rate will be compensated by higher and stable i.e. sustainable rates of economic/urban growth 
in future.  
 
In terms of impact on economic or urban growth, the fee helps to establish a stable situation 
in urban growth dynamics. Namely, new investments on which urban growth is based create 
new utility infrastructure development costs to be covered from the fee. The more 
investments, the more dynamic the urban growth will be, which means higher inflow of funds 
from which to fund the appropriate development of utility infrastructure. A lower level of 
investments, that is, lower level of urban growth, leads to a decrease of inflows from the 
collection of fees, but also, a lower need for investment into capital facilities, i.e. 
development of utility infrastructure.  
 
Finally, in terms of application, the fee may be applied both for public and private goods, 
which means that there are no utility infrastructure facilities that could not be funded by 
applying this mechanism. The fee, however, is not an easy instrument to apply, that is, it is 
rather administratively demanding. The first problem in its application is the setting of the fee 
itself, a methodologically demanding calculation of actual costs that are generated by the 
investor and that should be borne by him. The procedure leaves plenty of room for error, in 
an asymmetric way: there is greater likelihood of overestimating than underestimating the 
costs. The second problem results from the temporal mismatch of revenues and expenses, i.e. 
the inflow of funds from the fee and the outflow of funds for funding capital facilities of 
utility infrastructure. The problem is further aggravated in the case of utilities, that is, 
facilities where strong indivisibilities are present. It all comes down to the issue of financial 
bridging, and the most prominent role here can be played by loans, but also by local budgets. 
In other words, the application of the fee should be always considered along with the use of 
loans and budgets as auxiliary means for financing the construction or development of utility 
infrastructure.  
 
Open questions of possible application of the fee will be considered if an analysis shows that 
the fee is a superior way of funding the development of utility infrastructure.  
 
 
5.1.2. User charges 
 
 
User charge is a cost equally imposed on all users, both existing and new ones. Such cost is 
proportional to the consumption of the utility service, regardless of whether the consumption 
is measured directly (by means of water meters, for instance) or indirectly, through an 
approximation (the number of radiator ribs or the surface area of a flat in the case of heating 
or waste collection).    
 
The charge can be formulated in such a way that the total revenue earned by the collection of 
the charge covers all costs: operating costs (including depreciation) as well as development 
costs. It is undisputable, in terms of efficiency, that the user charge should enable the 
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coverage of all operating costs (including depreciation), but an arrangement where the user 
charge covers development costs has some unfavorable consequences for economic 
efficiency.        
 
Namely, the development costs caused by investors, i.e. new users, are uniformly distributed 
over all users, meaning that they are to the greatest extent borne by the existing users, 
although not caused by them. This contradicts the principle of efficiency that the expenses 
should be borne by those who generate them, which makes room for the moral hazard. In 
such an arrangement, existing users subsidize the new ones. The only possibility to avoid this 
is the perfect price discrimination according to the actual expenses generated by individual 
users. The impact fee, in particular the one set according to actual costs, is a form of such 
price discrimination. In other words, the correction of such a flaw in the user charge from the 
point of view of efficiency inevitably leads to its transformation into the impact fee.  
 
There is yet another problem with the application of the user charge from the point of view of 
efficiency. In the case of natural monopolies, the manufacturers operate in the zone of 
diminishing costs where marginal costs are lower than the average ones. Since the principle 
of allocative efficiency requires the charge to be equalized with the marginal costs, 
compliance with this principle in such conditions would inevitably lead to the financial losses 
of the utility company in question and its winding up in long term. This problem can be 
solved in several ways, and the most convenient one, in terms of efficiency, is to establish a 
two-component charge where one component does not depend on the volume of consumption 
and the other one is directly proportional to consumption. The first component is intended for 
covering the fixed costs, and the second for covering the variable costs. The portion of the 
charge intended for covering development costs would be included in the fixed component. 
Although, technically speaking this is feasible, still the basic problem cannot be eliminated, 
this being the discrimination of users according the different (fixed) costs they generate.  
 
The funding from the user charge does not satisfy the fairness requirement, since the costs are 
not borne by those who generate them. Namely, the existing users subsidize the new users, 
and this cannot be considered fair in any way whatsoever. True, this mechanism prevents the 
subsidization in the opposite direction, when, in case of increased consumption by existing 
users, the impact fee leads to the situation where new users subsidize the existing ones.  
 
The transparency of user charges as a financing mechanism is highly questionable. First, a 
two-component charge per se is not quite clear to the consumer who pays it. It would be very 
difficult, practically impossible, to make a clear charge breakdown, so that the consumer 
knows which part of costs makes which part of the charge. Furthermore, at least in towns 
across Serbia, the user charges for utility services are paid aggregately, so users do not take 
account of how much they pay for what, but treat it as the “utilities” charge.    
 
As for investments and economic/urban growth, at first glance such way of financing the 
development of utility infrastructure from user charges encourages investments – since the 
impact fee is not charged, that is, the existing users subsidize the new ones, the costs of 
investment projects decrease, thus increasing the number of projects that can be implemented. 
However, this method of funding utility infrastructure development only redistributes the 
costs without leading to a good selection of investment projects, and, thus, no account is 
taken of the comparative advantage a town has for a certain business activity, the appropriate 
territorial division of labor, or the sustainability of economic/urban growth. Accelerating 
growth by subsidizing a certain business activity is always possible, but is usually not good.  
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The implementation of user charge as the source of funding the development of utility 
infrastructure is associated with many problems. First of all, it cannot be applied in the case 
of local public goods, that is, those goods where users cannot be charged for their cost. 
Second, this funding method implies constant user charge fluctuations depending on the 
expenditures for the funding of the construction of capital utility infrastructure facilities. This 
implies repeated decision-making on price changes and calculation of price changes. There is 
also a question of revenue management, since charge revenues are the primary revenues of 
utility companies, which may lead to the problem of financial management.  
 
In this case as well, there arises the question of financial bridging, as some drastic charge 
increases are not always possible during the relatively short time when facilities are being 
built, and, consequently, high expenses, that is, big differences between revenues and 
expenses, are made. It is, therefore, necessary to have a possibility to raise a loan and support 
those investment projects that will result in a high leap in capacity.  
 
 
5.1.3. Budget financing 
 
 
Budget financing of the development of utility infrastructure impairs efficiency, because it 
disregards the principle that the costs should be borne by those who generate them. The costs 
are generated by the investors, i.e. new users, but borne by taxpayers, both those residing in 
the town in question as well as, generally, taxpayers in the country as a whole due to the 
existence of the grants going from the central to local budgets. At that, there is no possibility 
for the taxpayers to have any influence, by adapting, that is, changing their behavior 
regarding the consumption of utility services or investment projects, on the amount of tax 
they pay. Therefore, investors make their decisions without facing the total expenses they 
generate, which reduces economic efficiency. 
  
This method of funding the development of utility infrastructure also violates the principle of 
fairness stating that one should bear the costs one generates, since taxpayers subsidize 
investors, i.e. new users. Taking into consideration grants from the central to local budgets, 
and the principle of budgetary unity, according to which specific types of budget 
expenditures are not linked to the concrete, specific types of budget revenues, the costs of 
utility infrastructure development in a town are also borne by the taxpayers not residing in the 
town, and even if they are residents, by their behavior regarding utility consumption, they do 
not generate any additional costs, i.e. the costs of utility infrastructure development in the 
town. Although user charges as a mechanism of funding the development of utility sector 
also lead to the subsidization of investors, or new users, budget financing results in a much 
greater dispersion of those who subsidize investors. 
 
As for transparency, it is very low in the domain of collection, since, by nature of taxation, 
taxpayers do not know the flows, that is, where the funds collected by taxation are going. The 
use of funds collected in such a way is as transparent as is the public finances system in any 
country, but, generally speaking, here the transparency is lower than in systems of funding 
for intended purpose, such as impact fees or user charges for utility services.  
  
In terms of investment and economic/urban growth, the introduction of budget funding has 
some contradictory effects. Over the short term, the fact that investors do not bear the costs 
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they generate can increase the volume of investment, i.e. the number of investment projects. 
However, this results in a poor selection of investment projects, meaning that the 
economically unjustifiable projects are also implemented. Moreover, budget funding of utility 
infrastructure development inevitably leads to the increase of tax burden, which adversely 
affects economic growth. The increase of the tax burden, depending on the type of such 
burden and inefficiency of allocation of funds collected in such a way, may exceed the 
amount of impact fee, thus reducing the level of economic activity in long run. Those who are 
already in business will also reduce the level of production, which will in turn lead to a 
further slowdown of economic growth.   
 
Finally, in terms of ease of application, namely, operating problems associated with its 
application, budget funding is not too demanding, is relatively easy to apply, and unlike the 
user charge, can be applied even in the case of local public goods. However, even in the case 
of budget funding, there may exist a mismatch between revenues and expenses, since 
investment expenses for some capital infrastructure facilities may be huge, which raises the 
question of financial bridging, that is, there is room for the use of loans, or another borrowing 
mechanism, such as issuing bonds.  
  
 
5.1.4. Loans 
 
 
As mentioned earlier in the text, loans are an auxiliary mechanism for the funding of utility 
infrastructure development, since the loan repayment must be funded in one of the three 
already mentioned ways.  
 
While evaluating the ease of application of all the three above-mentioned funding 
mechanisms, we mentioned earlier that the revenues and expenses may be mismatched, so 
there may be a need for financial bridging. Accordingly, loans or other forms of funds 
borrowing improve the application of each of the above methods.  
 
Previous discussion has shown that impact fees are the most appropriate manner of 
infrastructure development funding.  
 
 
5.2. Basic issues regarding the application of impact fees     
 
 
5.2.1. Number of fees 
 
 
The first question is whether to charge investors only one fee or several fees, each for the 
specific capital utility infrastructure facility or for a specific utility activity. The principle that 
the one who generates specific costs should be the one to bear them imposes the need, in 
analytical terms, to charge as many fees as there are different capital facilities to be 
constructed in order to meet the increased demand for utilities. The existence of only one fee, 
as is the case in Serbia now, would prevent the application of this principle, lead to an over-
extensive averaging of costs, and thus to compromising the application of the fee in terms of 
economic efficiency.  
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Let us look at the extensive list of possible fees for: 
 
• Water supply and sewerage and storm water drainage 
• Transport infrastructure (streets, pavements, horizontal and vertical signalization, 
such as traffic lights, street trees, street lighting, bridges) 
• Parks, squares and other public/free access areas  
• Fire fighting service 
• Waste collection and permanent disposal 
• Public transport 
• Culture and art (museums, theatres, etc) 
• Ports and airports 
• Social welfare institutions 
• Schools 
• Government institutions 
• Heat supply 
• Power supply, etc 
 
As we may see, fees can also be introduced for purposes other than those related to utility 
infrastructure systems, such as cultural or social welfare institutions. Indeed, the idea of 
funding the construction of capital facilities through special fees competes with the concept 
of budget funding, thus raising the question of delineation between the two. However, this 
last issue will not be addressed, since our research is focused only on utilities. 
 
Naturally, in Serbia, there are other methods of funding some of these functions (for example, 
through public enterprises for power supply and airport services owned by the republic or 
privatized in future, or through the Ministry of Interior for the fire service) which need not be 
suggested therefore. However, this will be addressed in the sections to come.  
 
In addition to differentiating between individual utilities, it is possible to differentiate the fees 
(all or some) by particular territorial units in a town or district. In other words, it is possible to 
introduce different fees for the same service, for instance water supply, in different areas 
within the administrative unit depending on the functional inclusion in the catchment area of 
a particular infrastructure system. The reason for such differentiation naturally lies in 
potential differences in the expenses needed to raise capacity and quality of water supply 
services in different areas, that is, different local systems: for example in Mladenovac or 
Zemun (among Belgrade municipalities). Such differences are usual for American fees. The 
areas with different fees do not even have to match narrower territorial units, but can intersect 
them in the case of major facility construction, depending on the infrastructure system to 
which they belong.  
 
Finally, the question may arise as to whether, from the perspective of users or investors, the 
fee should be charged to a particular investor as integrated or not. The integrated fee 
simplifies the collection procedure and decreases its costs (which are not too high anyway), 
but decreases the transparency of the fee. Therefore, it is probably better to keep fees 
formally separate, in order to increase the transparency of costs. 
 
 
5.2.2.Special purpose nature of the fee? 
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The next important question is: “What to do with the money collected?” To forward it to the 
budget or to a fund for local infrastructure funding or to several strictly earmarked funds (for 
transport communications, water supply, sewerage, etc.)? This question cuts into the 
foundations of the concept of providing utility services, or local community role in it – for 
example, whether to organize provision of utilities through administrative bodies of local 
government, public enterprises or private companies – and therefore we will not go into a 
comprehensive discussion of this issue here, but will briefly discuss these options only from 
the financial point of view.  
 
Fiscal theory does not, for the most part, support the setting of special purpose taxes and 
other charges because in such a way, the desirable budgetary flexibility and adaptability of 
local expenditures to new circumstances or priorities in meeting the citizen needs is lost. 
Nevertheless, in special situations, fiscal theory allows special purpose funding: when a 
budgetary process is of poor quality, or when there is a strong connection between the charge 
and payer benefit. The weaknesses of the budgetary procedure, very common at the local 
level, prevents the proper funding of particular reasonable needs in favor of minor matters for 
the reason of political demagoguery, satisfaction of particular interests imposed in the process 
of public selection, or similar. It may therefore be highly desirable to protect the funding of 
capital projects, at least because of their long-term character, from the fickleness of some 
local politicians. Furthermore, special purpose funding gains credibility once the connection 
between payment and benefit becomes strong, which is the mechanism underlying these fees. 
A well-regulated connection between the fee and the benefit is, in essence, the surrogate 
price, which, as we have seen, is the road to efficiency in the field of utility infrastructure and 
construction in general.  
 
The next question concerns the way in which the funds collected through fees will be 
channeled to utility infrastructure development funding. The first option is to create fully 
specialized, special purpose funds, as many as there are utilities, i.e. specific capital utility 
infrastructure facilities. This option would enable the application of the principle of a strict 
earmarked allocation of collected funds. The other option is to create a single universal fund 
where all the proceeds from fees would be pooled, and the allocation of assets from such fund 
would not be strictly earmarked (strictly by the type of utility), but would respond to the 
needs and priorities set at the level of town/city or at the level of the entire utility industry, 
and not at the level of individual utility. Naturally, a combined solution is also possible; for 
instance, to have strict earmarked allocation in the case of all utilities falling into the category 
of individual utility consumption (private goods), and to create a single fund, regardless of 
the particular utility in question, in the case of construction of local public goods.     
 
Strict earmarked allocation provides for a high level of financial flow transparency and good 
incentives for efficient behavior, but opens the problem of financial management, having in 
mind, primarily, a high degree of indivisibility in the construction of facilities, and high cash 
outflows during the short construction period. Consistent earmarked allocation of funds may 
result in a situation where there is a deficit of funds needed for the construction of a facility 
for, say, permanent waste disposal, while the earmarked fund for, say, financing water supply 
facilities records a “surplus”, waiting for the lack of capacity to be manifested, or sufficient 
amount to start funding, let’s say, a capital water treatment facility. Surely, such situation 
cannot be viewed as favorable in terms of allocation or management of financial assets. 
Therefore we may start thinking about earmarked funds, but also about their centralized 
coordination, and, if needed, temporary “loans”, i.e. bridging.  
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The next key question is who is, or should be, the investor in new utility infrastructure 
facilities. The answer to this question depends on the answer to the question who should own 
the facilities, i.e. the property that makes up utility infrastructure. If this is the property that 
enables utility companies to operate, as is the case with water supply and sewerage networks, 
heating and gas pipelines, landfill, and the like, then it is necessary that it should be the 
property of such enterprises, and the enterprises should be investors. Only in such a way 
utility enterprises are encouraged to undertake all investor activities, i.e. to control the 
construction and equipment of facilities in the best possible manner, since in future their 
operations will depend on the proper functioning of that facility. If the property in question is 
a public good, in which case utility or other companies appear only as those who maintain 
those public goods, such as parks, public areas, streets, bridges, waterfronts, and so on, the 
owner of such property should be the town/city or local self-government unit, and then the 
local authorities should be the investor. It is clear that the funds allocation system should be 
such as to ensure a fast and efficient transfer of funds to investors.  
 
 
5.2.3. Fee differentiation and discounts 
  
 
Further on, there is the question of the need to differentiate the fee by user, namely, whether 
all users should pay the fee set in the same manner. Since the fee should equal the costs 
generated by investor, i.e. new users, for all users the fee should be specified in the same 
way, according to the actual costs that are generated. Naturally, when identifying such costs 
some approximations are inevitably used, for example: the projection of the consumption of 
water in one household based on certain average values or standards (number of household 
members, daily consumption), since the estimate of consumption for each household 
individually based on all data about the household would be an overwhelming task. 
 
Let us mention what the fee is not or should not be. Namely, the purpose of the fee is only to 
cover the costs that will be made by future users with regard to the local utility systems, i.e. 
(future) funding of utility infrastructure facilities. Such concept varies considerably from the 
situation in Serbia where the fee, in addition to the above role, also plays the role of an 
instrument for the capture of the so-called location rent, and so the amount of fee varies 
depending on the attractiveness of the location or its assumed value. Such an approach may 
have been justified at the time when there were no property taxes, but now it is not justified 
any more, since such tax is the basic instrument to tax location advantage or property value, 
and is used in Serbia with good results. Therefore, the fee under consideration will be defined 
mostly based on estimated costs, not by attempting to capture location rent.  The location 
factor may affect the amount of the fee, but only through the impact on costs: for instance, if 
new buildings/facilities are to be built in a remote part of the city territory, and thus entail 
higher utility expenses. 
 
Second, the fee should not be the means of development policy or social policy at the local 
level, that is, of fostering the development of some branches of economy, nor should it be a 
social policy instrument, as is often the case in Serbia. Namely, through differently structured 
land development fees, Serbia unnecessarily runs the development policy and fosters certain 
branches of manufacturing or services, or runs the social policy through the differentiation of 
fees by the estimated level of vulnerability or profitability of certain business activities 
(textile industry vs. financial services, etc) and other users. This not only continues to run the 
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long failed socialist development policy, but also wastes money that could be used much 
better. A far more efficient social policy is, when needed, run through budget expenses (cash 
grants), but not by differentiation of public revenue, i.e. placing the burden on the user.  
 
If, regardless of motivation, it is estimated that certain user groups should not pay the full 
amount of the fee, i.e. the amount corresponding to the costs they generate, the shortfall 
should be covered from the budget, and not by internal subsidization (by increasing the fee 
for others, non-subsidized users), since such subsidization would lead to very large and 
harmful distortions and negative consequences for investments and economic growth. Budget 
funding means that the increase in the number of subsidized users and the level of subsidy 
(the difference between costs generated and the amount of fee) moves the system of utility 
infrastructure development funding away from the impact fee, with all its strengths, toward 
budget funding, with all its weaknesses.  
   
The following questions relating to the application of the fee refer to some specific situations. 
The first important question is whether in the case of urban reconstruction, the fee should, in 
principle, be charged only for the difference between the consumption capacity of the old and 
the new facility, i.e. for the emerging rise in utility service demand, or for the entire amount 
of new demand, regardless of the demand generated by the previous building/facility. This is 
an important question, since an implicit assumption that the urban reconstruction is the 
increase in land use intensity (higher development density or residential density), and thus 
leads to an increased demand for all utility services. Thereby, it is possible to charge the fee 
only based on the consumption increase. However, some urban reconstruction projects, 
particularly those when industrial facilities are removed from the town center, lead to a drop 
in consumption. For instance, the closure of a brewery, i.e. its relocation out of town, leads to 
a fall in water consumption, since any new building/facility will inevitably have lower water 
consumption than the brewery. If the criterion of consumption difference were to be applied, 
in the case of the relocated brewery, not only that any new user could not be charged a fee, 
but it would even be necessary to compensate him, due to the decrease in consumption. This 
is the basic problem with the fee charged only on the basis of consumption difference 
generated by urban reconstruction projects, i.e. by applying the principle of the net change in 
demand, and this problem is often addressed in practice by charging an additional fee in case 
of the expected rise in consumption, while returning nothing in the case of reduced 
consumption. 
  
The second way is to charge the fee based on the gross change in demand. This means that 
investor pays the fee according to the total demand he will generate, regardless of the demand 
that existed with the previous facility. The application of this principle resolves the problem 
that occurred with the application of the principle of net change in demand, but a new 
problem arises. If a facility is to be relocated, like the example of the brewery relocated from 
the town center, should the investor in the new brewery at another location pay the full 
amount of the fee? If the fee at the old brewery location is charged in the full amount, then 
the investor should be exempted from the fee, since he already paid the fee when investing in 
the brewery at the first location. Even more interesting is the question of a brewery moving 
into another town, for example – how to treat the fee that had already been paid. A solution to 
this problem is to establish the secondary market of “paid fees” i.e. rights to build facilities 
without paying the fee. In such market the investor leaving town, who had paid the fee for the 
development of infrastructure, would “sell” his rights arising from the fee to another investor, 
or investors.  
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Another question that emerges is whether the impact fee should be applied when facilities are 
built under a concession arrangement. The very concept of concession is that the 
concessionaire, that is, investor into the facility, raises capital. The only possibility to recoup 
the investment is the user charge. In other words, the inclusion of concession arrangements as 
mechanisms for increasing the capacity of capital facilities of utility infrastructure inevitably 
results in the increase of prices, i.e. user charges as a mechanism for funding utility 
development. The more concessions there are, the more the financing system moves away 
from the fee and closer to the system based on the user charge.  
 
 
5.2.4. EU grants 
 
 
In the years to follow, during the process of stabilization and association or accession to EU, 
it is possible to expect substantial grants from EU intended for the development of utility 
infrastructure. In this way the increase in funds available for such purposes may be expected. 
In other words, it is possible to expect a lower level of the fee than it would be without 
additional funds – only a portion of infrastructure development costs is covered from the fee. 
Although the other part of expenses is funded from the budget, this is not related to any tax 
burden, either local or general, but the funds are obtained from abroad.     
  
What will be the distribution of EU grants by municipalities is yet unknown, but this is not an 
obstacle for the application of the impact fee. Although there are primarily political reasons 
to finance the entire infrastructure development in selected municipalities in this way, such 
approach should be avoided, i.e. the fee should be introduced in all municipalities or local 
self-government units, while allowing “the subsidization” of the fee to be different in 
different municipalities.  
 
Everything mentioned above with regard to EU grants also applies to any earmarked grants 
by central authorities, that is, to any chance that central authorities may get involved in the 
funding of utility infrastructure to a greater extent. A long-standing practice in Serbia (dating 
back to the SFRY times) has been that the central authorities “do not meddle” in the affairs of 
local self-governments, namely, do not take part in the funding of local infrastructure. The 
introduction of grants into local budgets as such is an innovation in that field, and it is 
possible to expect the initiation of earmarked grants for utility infrastructure development 
funding. 
 
Finally, the question is what happens with the funds collected on the basis of the fee, if the 
expected increase in demand or increase in the expected volume did not occur. In such 
situations, there is a surplus of funds, that is, some of the planned investments have not been 
realized. The practice in some countries that have such fees is to return the collected funds to 
the investors after a period of several years, if the investment into the capital utility 
infrastructure facility was not realized. In some other countries, the funds are not returned. 
  
 
5.3 Data required for collecting the fee  
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As mentioned several times in this study, the basic weakness of the impact fee is its relatively 
complicated and complex administration that can largely exceed the capacities of an average 
municipal administration in Serbia. 
 
The first and basic requirement for the application of the fee is to have clearly defined 
infrastructure development plans. Namely, local self-governments need to adopt plans with 
precisely specified new capacities of utility infrastructure needed, stating the costs of their 
construction as precisely as possible. After that step, it is necessary to fairly allocate the costs 
among newly constructed facilities. 
 
The fairness is, naturally, a rather vague concept, so it is more proper to say that the costs of 
construction of new capacities should be transferred to the newly constructed facility to the 
extent to which the construction of the new facility requires such new capacities. The 
calculation of the specific amount of the fee depends, of course, very much on the particular 
utility service. 
 
The situation with water supply services is relatively simple. If the plan specifies the 
construction of a new water treatment facility of the total capacity of 1,000 cubic meters of 
clean water per second, then the amount of the fee for the facility whose consumption 
capacity is one cubic meter per second should be equal to one thousandth of the costs 
incurred by the construction of the facility and its pertaining infrastructure (connection of the 
water treatment facility to the existing network, and so on). Since the water supply company 
knows the maximum capacity of the facility under construction (since the company gives its 
approval for the connection), for computing the water supply fee in Serbia the only 
requirements that are now practically needed are the plans for the extension of capacity and 
the appropriate cost estimate for the construction of such an extension. The situation is 
similar with the sewerage network (wastewater). Since almost all water that enters a facility 
must leave it through the sewerage network, on average about 80% of the water supplied 
(except in very specific situations where production processes themselves require a lot of 
water, like breweries), the capacity of the water connection specifies the capacity of the 
sewerage connection, so that in the case of sewerage, the only requirement that has to be met 
by local self-government units is the plan for the expansion of capacity of the relevant 
wastewater treatment facility. 
 
As for roads and streets, the situation is much more complicated, or may be much more 
complicated. If, however, the classification of potential uses of facilities is not too detailed, 
the system need not be too complicated. Our suggestion is to set the amount of the fee on the 
basis of the expected number of daily vehicle-kilometers that would be generated by the 
construction of the new facility. The assumption is that residential buildings would generate a 
relatively small number, and commercial buildings (particularly supermarkets, for example) a 
relatively large number of vehicle-kilometers. Then the actual cost of construction of a new 
road or street (that is a known value) would need to be divided by the total number of 
vehicle-kilometers generated by the construction of the facilities along the road and then 
multiplied by the number for each particular facility in order to define the amount of the fee 
for each building/facility. Moreover, it would be necessary to translate all types of vehicles 
(light and heavy trucks, cars, tank trucks) into equivalent units. 
 
The solution for pavements and street lighting could probably be much simpler, in terms that 
no special study is needed. It is possible to use several alternatives. One of the options is to 
use the planned number of occupants (or the number of residential units) in a residential 
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building, or the number of employees and consumers for a commercial building as the basis 
for calculating the amount of the fee. In our opinion such solution would be inferior, since 
sidewalks and street lighting are public goods to the highest degree, where an additional 
occupant/employee/ consumer does not entail any additional costs of construction, so that 
such payment collection method would not be a good one. The alternative and, in our 
opinion, superior suggestion is to charge the fee based on the size of the plot, since the length 
of the pavement and the number of public lighting fixtures primarily depend on that– the 
bigger the lot, the higher the pavement/lighting requirements. In that sense, the required data 
would not be too complex, since the only necessary data would be the total cost of 
construction and the surface area of the plot.  
 
As for the storm water drainage system, we consider that the land surface area is the only 
criterion to be used, since the quantity of collected precipitation depends only on that. All 
other possible indicators (number of occupants, surface area of a building) would be 
inadequate.  
 
As for parks, we consider that the size of a building (measured by its surface area), or 
otherwise, the number of occupants/employees, are the best indicators. Parks are, within the 
given capacity, public goods, but their capacity is, nevertheless, limited.  
 
The remaining issue to discuss here refers to the necessary data for waste disposal. For 
residential buildings, the only criterion would be the constructed floor area of the facility 
(considering that the planned number of occupants is not reliable), for shops and service 
facilities – the size of the shop; for office space – the built surface area; and for production 
facilities – the size and intended use of the facility, because there are huge differences in the 
quantity of generated waste depending on industry. The question also arises as to how to 
define a common price-list in a situation when in the case of residential buildings the fee is 
charged depending on the number of occupants, and for production facilities on the basis of 
intended use and size. Theoretically, the answer is possible (according to the quantity of 
waste the facility generates), but practically some shortcuts or assumptions, would have to be 
applied.  
 
In sum, the administration of the fee, in the segment relating to the proper allocation of costs 
among users, would not be too complicated. Cities would need to prepare one or two studies 
each (for roads and for waste) and it is likely to be quite sufficient. The studies could be more 
or less ambitious. There is a possibility to prepare a separate study for each expansion of 
capacity, and there is also another possibility to distribute the fee burden based on some 
average values. The first option is probably better in the case of water supply systems 
(because investments are relatively rare and large), while the second option is better suited to 
frequent, lower-cost investments, such as street construction, for instance. However, the 
implementation of the fee also requires the presence of detailed plans for the expansion of 
infrastructure capacity, which may pose a serious problem, particularly in small 
municipalities throughout Serbia.  
 
At first glance, the impact fee resembles the already applied construction land development 
fee, but in essence, this is an entirely different philosophy, since investors are requested to 
pay only the costs they actually generate, and the money paid may be spent only to provide 
services to those investors and their facilities, which means that the local self-government 
unit must maintain a database on who, when and exactly for what paid the impact fee. If the 
option to return the money to investors if the utility infrastructure facilities, for which they 
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paid, has not been built, and if investors are allowed to trade with the capacities they have 
already paid for (for example, if in the reconstruction of a plot of land, the new facility 
requires lower costs of providing infrastructure), local self-governments are then required to 
maintain the information system capable of following up such changes.  
 
 
5.4 The method of setting the fee and rights to appeal 
 
 
Payment of the fee is a contractual obligation of the investor. A contract is, thus, signed 
between town/city authorities and their bodies, namely, utility companies, on the one party, 
and the investor, on the other, where the town/city authorities, i.e. utility companies 
undertake to provide the relevant utility services. Therefore, the fee is, in essence, an initial 
price charged to the new user.  
 
For this reason, the manner of setting the fee is the same as the manner of setting the utility 
service charge. This transfers the problem to the field of economic regulation of utilities. The 
entire procedure in the economic regulation applied in the case of utility service charges 
should also be applied in the case of the fee.  
 
 
5.5 Fee charging options 
 
 
In principle, there are two possible bases for the calculation and charging of the fee. The first 
model would imply separate administration of fees for streets, water supply network, 
sewerage network, storm water drainage, pavements, parks, waste. The second model would 
imply aggregate contracting and charging of such fees. A hybrid model would mean that the 
charging is done by legal entities, so that the fee for water supply and sewerage is contracted 
with the relevant company, the fee for waste removal with another relevant company, and the 
fee for roads, pavements, storm water drainage and parks is aggregated for charging 
purposes, since there are no separate companies providing these services. 
 
We consider that whatever solution is accepted regarding the number of fees (one or more), 
local self-government units should enable investors to obtain all information relating to the 
amount and purpose of the fee charged to them in a “one-stop shop”. This would imply the 
preparation and printing of information brochures with detailed explanations as to who must 
pay the fee, in what amount and why. Furthermore, one could pay all the fees (or only one 
fee) there, while any further distribution of proceeds from the fee should not be the investor’s 
concern. We believe that it is possible that all fee beneficiaries sign an agreement that 
precisely stipulates the method of charging and distribution of proceeds from the fee at the 
local self-government level, and, thus, considerably facilitate the investor’s task.   
 
Moreover, it would be useful if the local self-government units (particularly larger ones) 
would publish maps of all zones with different fees charged together with fee amounts. For 
instance, a map could present the amount of the street fee to be paid in a new settlement in 
one part of the town, and the amount of the same fee in another part of the town. Since the 
costs of road and street construction depend on the specific location (type of soil, 
infrastructure already in place, need to construct a bridge/overpass), street construction costs 
must inevitably vary depending on the part of the town. 
 
Center for Liberal –Democratic Studies 
43
Reform of Land Development Fee in Serbia 
 
Municipalities (or another institution calculating and charging the fees) would also have to 
undertake to provide the investor with a free estimate of the total fee for different locations. 
Such service would considerably improve the utilization of the sites that already have the 
infrastructure in place, and thus to a more efficient use of urban land. 
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6.  PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF THE  
CONSTRUCTION LAND DEVELOPMENT FEE  
 
 
 
In the previous chapters we have first indicated the deficiencies of the existing construction 
land development fee; second, we have examined alternative forms of construction financing, 
i.e., of the development of utility infrastructure and chosen one fee that, at least at first sight, 
has similar features as our current construction land development fee and, third, presented the 
most important principles of that fee and possible options for its implementation. In this 
section, we shall try to operationalize the proposed changes and to corroborate them, thus 
creating a basis for regulatory changes at both the level of local communities and central 
level, to the extent necessary. 
 
We also propose a change in the name of this instrument, due to its important applications, so 
that it can be differentiated from the current development fee, i.e., so that a difference in both 
its role and character can be more precisely expressed. In the further text, these fees will be 
called fees for (utility) infrastructure or infrastructure fees. 
 
 
6.1. Purpose of Infrastructure Fees 
 
 
The purpose of the funds raised through these fees is, of course, the financing of 
infrastructure, since, as we saw, earmarked financing through the fees makes sense from the 
financial and budgetary standpoint not only as a good instrument, but, more importantly, as 
an instrument which can result in a more efficient use of construction land in Serbia, if 
properly used. Still, such a global position is certainly not enough, so we shall try and suggest 
in the further text some important features of the system for the use of that revenue. 
 
The basic question here is whether the purpose of the revenue from certain fees should be 
strictly predetermined, in terms of an obligation to use, for instance, the revenue from the fee 
for water supply exclusively for the building of water supply facilities, or it can be more 
flexibly used for the building of some other facilities of utility infrastructure. Moreover, a 
question is raised whether in such a case an arrangement should be provided for according to 
which the collected money from one fee is to be returned to the payers if it has not been used 
for planned investments into the given activity in the prescribed time limit, or the 
“borrowing” among different narrowly specialized funds should be allowed. 
 
This strictly dedicated system has its own logic and political attractiveness and it is frequent 
in the United States of America. Specifically, it has a politically desirable feature: it is easier 
to garner support for it among citizens, as well as lawmakers, because it is almost a guarantee 
that the money will be spent on a planned and proper purpose and that it will not be used for 
any other purpose, for example, for wages or similar purposes that are popular among local 
politicians and in the administration of the local authorities, which is a concern for both 
citizens and lawmakers. This political argument has certain plausibility, although the U.S. 
experience shows that making refunds to investors is extremely rare,2 because the local 
authorities have found ways to avoid this worst case scenario. 
                                                 
2 See State Impact Fee Enabling Acts, Dunkan Associates, 2007, p. 10 
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On the other hand, there are certain weaknesses of this strictly dedicated arrangement with 
respect to resource allocation. This involves the fact that there are significant indivisibilities 
in the case of utility infrastructure, particularly in some utility activities, that is, the facilities 
of their infrastructure. These indivisibilities give rise to a lack of coordination in time 
between expenditure for the building of new capacities and revenue from collected fees. 
Moreover, the indivisibilities of capacities create a considerable reserve capacity over a 
prolonged period, i.e., new users are connected to such reserve capacity of the system. In 
other words, while at a certain point in time, that is, period, there is no need for new capital 
facilities in the case of one type of utility infrastructure facilities, in other utility activities 
there is a great need for that. A strict distribution of resources for specified purposes means 
that in such situations an earmarked fund for one utility activity will run a surplus, while an 
earmarked fund for another activity will run a deficit.      
 
It is obvious that this problem should be resolved while preserving all the advantages of 
earmarked use of the collected resources. To this end, it is necessary to reach a compromise. 
Therefore, we suggest the establishment of two earmarked funds into which the resources 
will flow: one should be the fund for financing capital facilities in the field of individual 
utility consumption, i.e., the provision of private goods (water supply, of wastewater 
drainage, district heating, gas distribution, permanent waste disposal, etc.), and the second 
one should be the fund for financing capital facilities in the field of collective utility 
consumption, i.e., the provision of public goods. In this manner, the necessary flexibility of 
financing would be achieved in line with clearly set priorities, and a situation prevented 
where the money collected from one infrastructure fee would sit idle, or even be returned to 
investors, while in some other utility activity there would be insufficient capacities and a 
considerable shortage of resources necessary for financing investments to overcome that 
problem. The arrangement with the existence of two funds is based on several important 
differences which exist between these two types of utility activities.  
 
First, in the case of private goods, services are rendered directly by companies, for the time 
being public utility companies, and it is only natural that these companies should be 
investors, i.e., that they should carry out those investments, since those fixed assets will 
enable these companies to operate, i.e., to provide relevant utility services. Conversely, local 
public goods, i.e., the services of collective utility consumption, are not provided by utility 
companies (they may, instead, take part exclusively in the maintenance of these goods). 
Therefore, it is natural for the investor into those facilities to be a local community, that is, a 
local self-government unit.  
 
Second, major indivisibilities can be found precisely in the case of capital facilities of 
individual utility consumption, such as water factories, water supply main rings, heating 
plants, landfills for permanent waste disposal, etc. In the case of public goods, i.e., the 
facilities of collective utility consumption, for the most part there are no major 
indivisibilities. Exceptions may be bridges over large rives. Moreover, there is even certain 
complementariness, rather than rivalry among investments in local public goods: investments 
into new streets also imply investments in pavements, lines of trees, storm water drainage, 
street lighting, appropriate public areas, etc. In other words, due to the existence of major 
indivisibilities, precisely in the field of private utility goods, one should expect a great need 
for financial “bridging”. Consequently, it is important to strictly separate these activities from 
other ones, where there will be no need for so much gap bridging.  
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Third, the privatization of some public utility companies can be expected in the foreseeable 
future. That privatization will inevitably bring about further changes in the status of the fee 
for the development of utility infrastructure, namely in the direction of further selectivity of 
its purpose. Privatization is realistic exclusively in the field of private goods, so such dual 
structure of funds means that changes will occur only within one fund.   
 
The fee for utility infrastructure for each individual utility activity should always be levied, 
irrespective of whether there is an immediate need for the construction of new capital 
facilities or not. Thus, for instance, if the existing water supply system in a city meets all the 
present and projected need for water supply in the foreseeable future, then the infrastructure 
fee for water supply will not be eliminated, but rather levied in the future as well, with this 
revenue being directed into the mentioned fund, that is, into the financing of facilities in other 
utility infrastructure activities, where the situation is the most unfavorable in that respect. 
Furthermore, if one takes a closer look at the logic of infrastructure fees – everybody paying 
his own bills – it is possible to see that the investor should pay not only for investments in 
new infrastructure facilities, but also for the use of the capacities of the existing ones. For, if 
the principle is for everyone to pay his own bill in full, then it is natural for new users to also 
pay for the use of current capacities, since these costs, too, should be included in that total 
bill. In line with that, in many U.S. states laws allow local authorities to use the collected fee 
as compensation for the previously invested funds in local infrastructure.3  
 
 
6.2. Types of Infrastructure Fees 
 
 
As previously mentioned, infrastructure and related fees can be introduced for very different 
forms of social life, and particularly when the notion of infrastructure is expanded to include 
social infrastructure as well. Still, we shall make a proposal here, which is limited to utility 
infrastructure in the narrow sense, namely the one whose investment financing, in line with 
the applicable laws, falls into the competence of local communities. 
 
More specifically, in choosing utility activities whose development should be financed out of 
fees, one has also paid attention to whether the mentioned activity can be performed against 
the backdrop of competition, i.e., whether competition can be established in the mentioned 
activity. If that is the case, i.e., if these are not the so-called network activities which have all 
the features of a natural monopoly, one should not levy a fee to finance the development of 
capacities within that activity. Simply, in this case, the capacities are developed by 
competitors operating in that activity, regardless of whether competition is direct competition 
among competitors themselves (e.g., as in public bus transportation) or their indirect 
competition (such as the competition over the grant of the right to collect waste in a particular 
territory). Accordingly, in such cases the development of capacities cannot be financed by 
means of fees, since it is not known which capacity, that is, part of the capacities, will be 
developed by an individual (current or future) competitor.  
 
Consequently, the following fees for utility infrastructure would be levied:  
 
a) Private goods: 
                                                 
3 This does not involve operational costs, including depreciation, since those costs should be covered 
from the price of the service.    
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• for water supply 
• for drainage and purification of waste waters 
• for permanent disposal of, i.e., care for solid waste  
• for district heating 
• for gas distribution 
 
b) Public goods:   
 
• for traffic (streets, pavements, local roads, storm water drainage, bridges, 
horizontal and vertical traffic signs, street trees/greenery, street lighting, etc.), 
• for public areas (squares, parks and public greenery, cemeteries, waterfronts, 
recreational areas, etc.), 
 
Besides establishing a large number of strictly earmarked fees, it is necessary to also 
geographically define the collection of fees, i.e., to define it according to the specific 
infrastructure system to which the observed facility belongs. In other words, the fee is 
collected and the thus raised resources are pooled for developing the capacities of a specific 
infrastructure system on which the burden is increased due to the construction of a new 
facility.   
 
This will enable the solving of an urgent problem in the existing system, connected with the 
question of how to treat villages, i.e., rural communities, that is, whether to levy the 
construction land development fee on them or not. Practice in Serbia varies – in some 
villages, the development fee is levied, while in most of them it is not – and the mentioned 
dilemma is created due to the fact that all utility activities and services, which exist in 
neighboring cities, certainly do not exist in villages, so it is not fair to levy the same fee on 
those living in villages and those living in cities. Hence, the replacement of one fee with 
many fees, namely based on the functional principle, will enable the collection of only those 
infrastructure fees in villages, which will benefit the inhabitants of villages, and not of other 
ones, which resolves the mentioned problem. Thus, for instance, fees will be levied for public 
transportation or for traffic, while the fees for installation of district heating, water supply or 
waste collection will not normally be levied. 
 
 
6.3. Criteria, Formula 
 
 
This section will present a proposal for the criteria and operational measures by means of 
which one should calculate infrastructure fees in Serbian municipalities and cities.  
 
The first principle which should be observed has already been mentioned, and that is the 
principle according to which investors (and users) should contribute to the financing of 
individual utility infrastructure facilities in line with their consumption of the given service. 
Since it is a cost-based principle, the level of the fee must be in direct proportion to their 
(future) consumption. 
 
The second principle is contained in the first one, but it may be insufficiently discernible, so 
we shall present it explicitly, and it is a classical principle of fiscal fairness. It reads that the 
equal should be treated equally and the unequal unequally. In other words, those should pay 
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equal amounts who put equal burdens on local utility systems, and those who put different 
burdens should pay unequally.   
 
These two principles very clearly exclude from the circle of options all those based on the 
idea of redistribution, or so-called solidarity, when better-off taxpayers pay more than those 
who are not doing so well, for social or so-called developmental reasons. As already 
mentioned before, social reasons and reasons related to development policies, as they are 
implemented in Serbia today, have no place in this concept of infrastructure fees; instead, it 
has to rely exclusively on the (estimated) consumption of individual utility services. And if, 
for instance, different planned facilities (residential buildings, office space, industry, etc.) 
consume the same amount of water, then they should pay equal fees for water supply. 
Nothing more and nothing less. Only in that manner it is possible to secure efficient use of 
urban land and fairness of the system for financing utility infrastructure. 
 
If these principles for setting infrastructure fees are accepted, then it boils down to a technical 
problem of obtaining data, though it is by no means trivial or irrelevant as a problem. 
Specifically, the main difficulty is in the fact that, at the point of calculation of infrastructure 
fees, practically no single piece of necessary data is available, but one has to work either with 
estimates or with proxy variables, hence those which can replace and/or express, to a smaller 
or larger extent, accurate data on both the future value of capital infrastructure facilities, and 
on the future consumption of utility services by various new users.  
 
Let us take these issues one by one. In the case of residential facilities, there are two realistic 
indicators which could be an expression of future consumption of services in utility activities: 
the first one is the number of permanent household members, and the second one is the 
constructed area of the facility. The third option – to include the facility as such in the 
calculation, as a unit, is certainly not fair because declaring that all houses are equal ignores 
objective but considerable differences which occur in consumption across various 
households. The advantage of this last indicator is easy access to data – each house or 
apartment for which a permit is sought becomes that piece of data, without other 
complications. 
 
Let us go back to the two realistic options. For some of infrastructure fees the criterion of the 
constructed area of the facility is entirely appropriate, as in installation of district heating, 
since the load on the heating plant is largely proportionate to the area of the house or 
apartment. Of course, it is possible to make a difference in the calculation between individual 
and collective residential buildings, as individual houses need more calories for equal amount 
of heat, due to technical reasons. The area of an apartment, that is, its share in the total area of 
the collective housing facility can be used as a weight for setting the fee, if it is possible to 
come across a direct indicator of consumption. For example, in the collective housing 
buildings an indicator of the maximum possible water consumption for the entire building is 
the diameter of the connection. On the basis of that diameter, it is possible to determine the 
fee that will be collected from the investor, and the total amount of the fee, if need be, can be 
distributed by apartment according to the constructed area of each apartment.      
 
In the case of the use of parks and recreational and similar spaces, for example, the number of 
household members is probably the best measurement of the load (use), while the area of the 
apartment or house plays no role. However, the number of household members is not used 
anywhere as a variable in the calculation of such fees for the most part because (1) the 
records of the public authorities on the current residence of the population are incomplete 
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and/or outdated and (2) the situation is highly volatile and susceptible to manipulation, i.e., 
changes aimed at avoiding the payment of dues, hence of these fees as well. Therefore, we 
suggest avoiding the use of this indicator in Serbia.  
 
With respect to many other infrastructure fees both the number of dwellers and the area of the 
building or apartment could be an indicator of the load placed by the users of future 
residential facilities. Although it appears that the number of dwellers is the only good 
indicator, it is certain that households with higher incomes (consequently, with more 
apartment space) have higher consumption in per capita terms than households with lower 
incomes. Since, as pointed out, the number of household members should not be used as an 
indicator, we are left with the area of a building as an indicator and it is customarily used in 
the U.S. and in Serbia, and it should be also used in the future in our municipalities and cities. 
Still, there is a reasonable belief that consumption of services in utility activities does not 
increase in proportion to an increase in the area of a residential facility, so the owners of 
larger housing units pay more than they should.  If that belief prevails, it is possible to 
establish a degressive scale with the area as the only variable. In a general case, it would look 
like this: 
 
N = F + a*P 
 
where N stands for – the amount of the fee, F – for a fixed component whose level does not 
depend on the area of the facility, a – for a coefficient for each square meter of the area and P 
– the area of the facility. This formula ensures that the amount of the fee goes up at a slower 
pace than an increase in the housing space area. Let us mention another alternative: setting a 
cap on the housing facility area, in that a particular fee is not increased above a certain limit 
for the area. 
 
In the case of water supply facilities, it is possible to clearly distinguish several categories, 
such as production (industrial) facilities, office space and business premises and premises for 
trading. The purpose of such a classification is to place into one group those facilities which, 
based on the same purpose, have the same or similar consumption of utility services per 
selected unit. Insisting on a very detailed classification (e.g. industrial branches) can become 
problematic due to the unavoidable appearance of a large number of multi-purpose premises, 
with attending complications.  
 
For the basic, previously mentioned, classification the use of the facility area indicator is 
absolutely satisfactory, of course, with different values for production, trading and office 
space. In detailed classifications, other possibilities also open up: in hotels - the number of 
rooms, in movie theaters – the number of seats or the facility itself as a unit in gas stations or 
trailers.  
 
If for some larger industrial or commercial facility the planned consumption of a service 
significantly deviates from the average applied in the calculation of the fee, it is possible, at 
the request of either the investor or the local authorities, to make a separate calculation for 
that facility and apply, as more realistic, the consumption level projected in the technological 
design of the facility,  
 
The location should not be such criterion as it is presently in Serbia, since new fees will not 
serve to collect city rents, but only real costs. Yet, the location may be included in the 
calculation in a slightly different manner – as a factor of future costs. If, for example, a water 
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supply system is built only in one city of a municipality, then only investors from that city 
should pay the fee for water supply, but not the investors from surrounding villages. In other 
words, it is possible to divide the given territory of a municipality or a city into separate areas 
in which one fee will be applied in different amounts or not be levied at all in part of the 
territory. In that sense, the location is important only as a basis for identifying to which local 
infrastructure system the observed facility belongs.   
 
To sum up, we suggest, if there is no direct technical indicator of the expected consumption 
of utility services, using the area of the facility as a standard indicator of the expected 
consumption of utility services, since it is an indicator which gives a fairly good 
approximation of the consumption 'capacity' of the facility, and it is readily available in the 
standard case, as it is incorporated in the design submitted to the construction authorities. 
Only in some specific situations other, previously mentioned, indicators are possible. 
 
The table below shows some of the possibilities for formulating the amount of the fee. 
 
Fee Primary criterion Secondary criterion 
Water supply  Diameter of the connection Area of the facility 
Sewerage  Diameter of the connection  Area of the facility 
Waste disposal Area of the facility Purpose of the facility 
District heating Area of the facility Cubic volume of the facility
Gas distribution Diameter of the connection Purpose of the facility 
Transportation  Projected traffic Area of the facility 
Public areas  Area of the facility Area of land 
 
 
6.4. Exemptions and Deductions 
 
 
Since the concept, as already mentioned on several occasions, relies, for good reason, on the 
principle of covering one’s own costs and avoiding the spillovers between investors and 
users, for the sake of improvement in construction efficiency and use of land, one can only 
repeat on this occasion, too, regarding the issue of exemptions and deductions, that no 
discounts for reasons related to social or developmental policies should exist. Besides the 
mentioned reason – coverage of one’s own costs – it is possible to mention another two: 
• in this case there certainly is no need for deductions based on social considerations, 
since, by definition such individuals are engaged in investing into real estate, i.e., 
building residential and commercial facilities, who are not poor, and those firms that 
are not in a poor financial state, consequently, those who dispose of considerable 
funds, 
• there is also no need for deductions associated with developmental policies because, 
first, the ideas from the socialist period about how to boost economic development 
should be definitely abandoned, since the market and the financial system are 
becoming the entities allocating investments and, second, modern policy of local 
economic development is not pursued at the cost of undermining the efficiency of 
construction, but rather in some other ways.4 
 
                                                 
4 See Strategy for Local Economic Development - Handbook, CLDS, 2005 
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If a local community nevertheless decides to give privileges to certain users, for example, for 
social reasons, the best way to preserve the consistency of the system is to set aside the 
resources for such deductions in the local budgets, so as not to undermine through deductions 
the principle of paying for one’s own bills, and exclusively his own bills.  
 
Of course, not all the fees would be paid for all categories of construction and facilities, but 
only those that will benefit the given category of building, immediately or in a foreseeable 
future. Thus, for example, the fee for the installation of district heating would not be collected 
from those investors whose facilities are not planned for connection to the district heating 
system and who are solving the issue of heating for their facilities by themselves. 
 
 
6.5. Possible Procedure for Setting Infrastructure Fees 
 
 
The procedure for setting fees could be the following: 
 
1. make projections for the building of individual categories of facilities (residential, 
production, etc.), namely, both by area in square meters, and by location, on the basis 
of plans for the development of a local community, spatial and zoning plans and other 
technical documentation; the time horizon of the projections should be at least five 
years, 
 
2. make projections of a rise in the consumption of certain types of utility services 
(water, waste, streets, etc.), on the basis of the projection of building and normal 
standards of consumption for individual categories of users (households, industry, 
office and trading space, etc.), 
 
3. estimate investments that should be made in order to achieve an increase in capacities 
necessary to meet higher consumption needs, 
 
4. choose indicators (area, etc.) and calculate fees by category of facilities, by dividing 
the aliquot part of investments induced by the given category of facilities with the 
estimated consumption of the service per square meter (or some other indicator). 
 
In this or a similar manner, it is possible to set all the envisaged fees.  
 
The reevaluation of the fee should be carried out in two manners: 1) for the purpose of 
ensuring protection against inflation-related erosion of the value, revaluation is to be 
performed every year and 2) for the purpose of including new data in the evaluation (changes 
in projections, new prices of the construction of capital facilities, etc.), investment valuations 
should be renovated (refreshed) every two or three years. 
 
 
6.6. Directing Collected Revenue 
 
 
Collected revenue would be directed into two mentioned funds (for private and public goods) 
from which only investments would be financed. These resources should under no 
circumstances be included in the budget, since that would threaten the possibility to finance 
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utility infrastructure facilities due to probable spillovers into other purposes not related to 
infrastructure, which depend on the political process at the local level.  
 
These funds should by no means be used for financing current maintenance of utility 
infrastructure facilities and their daily functioning, since resources for those purposes are 
secured out of current revenue of utility companies, and since prices of the services should be 
increased, if they are not sufficient, rather than using the money earmarked for investment. 
 
 
6.7. Necessary Legislative Changes  
 
 
The application of the new concept, i.e., new fee for the development of utility infrastructure 
requires amendment of Article 74 of the Law on Planning and Construction, which now 
reads: „The construction land development fee shall be paid by the investor. The level of the 
construction land development fee shall be determined in a contract concluded between the 
municipality, i.e., a company or another organization referred to in Article 72, paragraph 3, of 
this Law, and the investor, on the basis of criteria and standards established by the 
municipality. The contract referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article regulates mutual 
relationships in respect of development of construction land, the level of the construction land 
development fee, the fee payment schedule, and the volume, structure and time limits for the 
performance of land development works.“ 
 
Bearing in mind the proposed changes, it is necessary to replace the words „ on the basis of 
criteria and standards...“ by the words „on the basis of actual costs for expanding utility 
infrastructure capacities, which are generated by the new facility“. 
 
On the basis of such amendment to the Law, local self-government units can specify in their 
decisions all the required elements on the basis of which a decision is taken. 
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